Sunday, 31 July 2011
How to be an Afghan Expert
Cynical post over at Ghosts of Alexander on how to be an Afghanistan expert.
The Moro War: An Insurgency and Its Lessons
Review of The Moro War by Mark Moyar, the author of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq.
Some key points (I've pruned, but not much - there was so much good stuff.)
The Americans in Moroland outlawed slavery and polygamy. The governors required Moro children to attend secular schools instead of Islamic ones. To halt rampant armed robbery, the administrators compelled every Moro man to surrender his sword. Mr. Arnold concedes that, despite some protestation, many Moros liked the American policies and beseeched the U.S. to delay plans for their self-rule.
Other aspects of the Moro War, though, bear close resemblance to recent Islamic insurgencies. In Moroland as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. introduced Western principles of law, government and education without explaining to Muslims how such principles were consistent with the Quran. Religiously motivated violence resulted.
"The Moros saw American military restraint as weakness," he writes. "The Moro understanding of Mohammed's life story taught that a party engaged in diplomacy merely to buy time to recover from setback."
Early counterinsurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from the same ignorance. Western nations, impatient to appear benevolent and remove their troops, showed a reluctance to use force and an eagerness to negotiate that conveyed weakness. Some Western policy makers still have not grasped that displaying an eagerness to use force and a reluctance to negotiate offers the most promising route to peace. ["Be prepared to kill"]
But other officers, like Tasker Bliss and John Pershing, defused crises by first talking with local leaders. Sometimes the Moros backed down when confronted by stern talk and the threat of force. Sometimes they did not and had to be given what Pershing called "a good sound drubbing." By talking before shooting, Americans increased U.S. influence, building personal relationships and demonstrating a commitment to impartial justice.
When Americans stepped in, they were able to resolve Moro legal clashes fairly, gaining respect. One officer explained that spending days in the heat hearing testimony about the contested ownership of a buffalo "seemed at times to be without purpose and without result," but "the results in the end were prodigious; nothing less than the trust, confidence, and affection of the huge majority of the Moro people."
As Mr. Arnold notes, the patience, knowledge and talent required for prolonged dealings with the Moros were scarce commodities. It was a good thing, one officer remarked, that Gen. Pershing was put in charge instead of "some fool officer who ignorantly supposed that he could come and in an off-hand manner manage these savages."
Proper qualifications are as scarce now as then. Thus assigning the right Americans to work with Afghans will rank among the U.S.'s greatest challenges in the coming years. From the start, a respect for Afghan sovereignty has required U.S. officials to rely heavily on personal influence and negotiation to get Afghans to do the right thing. That reliance will only increase as the reduction in America's presence brings Afghan stewardship to the fore.
Some key points (I've pruned, but not much - there was so much good stuff.)
The Americans in Moroland outlawed slavery and polygamy. The governors required Moro children to attend secular schools instead of Islamic ones. To halt rampant armed robbery, the administrators compelled every Moro man to surrender his sword. Mr. Arnold concedes that, despite some protestation, many Moros liked the American policies and beseeched the U.S. to delay plans for their self-rule.
Other aspects of the Moro War, though, bear close resemblance to recent Islamic insurgencies. In Moroland as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. introduced Western principles of law, government and education without explaining to Muslims how such principles were consistent with the Quran. Religiously motivated violence resulted.
"The Moros saw American military restraint as weakness," he writes. "The Moro understanding of Mohammed's life story taught that a party engaged in diplomacy merely to buy time to recover from setback."
Early counterinsurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from the same ignorance. Western nations, impatient to appear benevolent and remove their troops, showed a reluctance to use force and an eagerness to negotiate that conveyed weakness. Some Western policy makers still have not grasped that displaying an eagerness to use force and a reluctance to negotiate offers the most promising route to peace. ["Be prepared to kill"]
But other officers, like Tasker Bliss and John Pershing, defused crises by first talking with local leaders. Sometimes the Moros backed down when confronted by stern talk and the threat of force. Sometimes they did not and had to be given what Pershing called "a good sound drubbing." By talking before shooting, Americans increased U.S. influence, building personal relationships and demonstrating a commitment to impartial justice.
When Americans stepped in, they were able to resolve Moro legal clashes fairly, gaining respect. One officer explained that spending days in the heat hearing testimony about the contested ownership of a buffalo "seemed at times to be without purpose and without result," but "the results in the end were prodigious; nothing less than the trust, confidence, and affection of the huge majority of the Moro people."
As Mr. Arnold notes, the patience, knowledge and talent required for prolonged dealings with the Moros were scarce commodities. It was a good thing, one officer remarked, that Gen. Pershing was put in charge instead of "some fool officer who ignorantly supposed that he could come and in an off-hand manner manage these savages."
Proper qualifications are as scarce now as then. Thus assigning the right Americans to work with Afghans will rank among the U.S.'s greatest challenges in the coming years. From the start, a respect for Afghan sovereignty has required U.S. officials to rely heavily on personal influence and negotiation to get Afghans to do the right thing. That reliance will only increase as the reduction in America's presence brings Afghan stewardship to the fore.
Terence Wood on the foreign aid debate
Aid is no panacea: it can’t solve all the problems of the world by any means. But it can, and does, help. Similarly economic growth has an important role to play. Yet economic growth isn’t everything either, and even in its absence some good can be done.
Terence Wood is a PhD student at ANU. Prior to commencing study he worked for the New Zealand government aid programme.
Behind Africa’s famine, more than just drought
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/behind-africas-famine-more-than-just-drought-famine-isnt-inevitable/2011/07/28/gIQAJCrsfI_story.html
By William G. Moseley, Published: July 29
More than 12 million people are at risk of death and starvation in the Horn of Africa. Even if they do not perish, young children are likely to suffer the lifelong effects of malnutrition, including poor brain development. While reactions of grave concern over this unfolding tragedy are natural, its causes are not. Most commentators cite the worst droughts since the 1950s and security concerns in southern Somalia as the main reasons for the crisis. Taken alone, however, these explanations are deeply flawed.
Drought and insecurity certainly contribute to the current crisis, but more fundamental causes are at play. Drought is not a new environmental condition for much of Africa but a recurring one. The semi-arid Horn of Africa and the entire Sahelian region — running just south of the Sahara Desert across the continent — have long experienced erratic rainfall. While climate change may be exacerbating rainfall variability, traditional livelihoods in the region are adaptable to deal with situations when rainfall is not dependable.
The dominant livelihood in the Horn of Africa has long been herding. Traditionally, herders ranged widely across the landscape in search of better pasture, focusing on areas as meteorological conditions dictated. The approach worked because, unlike fenced-in pastures in North America, it was incredibly flexible and adapted to variable rainfall. As farming has expanded, including in some instances to large-scale commercial farms, the routes of herders have become more concentrated and more vulnerable to drought. The change from traditional practices has also become detrimental to the landscape. In Ethiopia, large land leases (or “land grabs”) to foreign governments and companies for export crops (such as palm oil, rice and sugar) have further exacerbated this problem.
Agricultural livelihoods have also evolved in problematic ways. In anticipation of years of poor rainfall, farming households and communities historically stored surplus crop production. Sadly, this traditional strategy for mitigating the risk of drought was undermined from the colonial period, beginning in the late 19th century, as households were encouraged (if not coerced by taxation) to grow cash crops for the market and store less and less excess grain for potential bad years. This increasing market orientation has also been encouraged by development banks. Growing crops for market worked fine as long as cheap and plentiful grain was available for purchase, a trend that began to erode in 2000 as global food prices gradually rose.
Just as death from exposure is not an inherent result of a cold winter, famine is not a natural consequence of drought. Simply put, the structure of human society often determines who is affected and to what degree.
While the nations of the world must act immediately to address the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa, working to ensure prompt delivery and distribution of food aid, these same countries must also consider the underlying causes of the crisis as they seek longer-term solutions. Many, including the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Rajiv Shah, have spoken about the need for a strategy to rebuild food security in the region.
The problem is that the USAID plan for agricultural development in Africa has stressed a “New Green Revolution” involving improved seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. While this energy-intensive approach may make sense in some contexts, it is financially out of reach of the poorest of poor farmers, who are the most likely to face food shortfalls. A more realistic approach would play down imported seeds and commercial agriculture in favor of enhanced traditional approaches to producing food for families and local markets.
Ethiopia, a key recipient of U.S. aid in the Horn of Africa region, should also be strongly discouraged from granting long-term leases of its farmland to foreign entities when it struggles to feed its own people in years of poor rainfall.
Finally, the crisis in the Horn of Africa has been aggravated by high food prices worldwide. Global food prices reached a historic high in February, surpassing the spikes of 2007-08, which had been the highest recorded in 20 years. While current prices are related, in part, to bad weather, other significant factors include high energy prices, the increasing diversion of grain for the production of biofuels, and export restrictions.
With energy and food prices likely to remain high for months to come, Africa can no longer count on cheap imported food or afford to shift to energy-intensive crop production strategies. The path to improved food security lies in improving time-tested local approaches, which are attuned to local environmental conditions.
The writer is a professor of geography and African studies at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minn. He previously worked for Save the Children (UK) on food security issues in Africa.
By William G. Moseley, Published: July 29
More than 12 million people are at risk of death and starvation in the Horn of Africa. Even if they do not perish, young children are likely to suffer the lifelong effects of malnutrition, including poor brain development. While reactions of grave concern over this unfolding tragedy are natural, its causes are not. Most commentators cite the worst droughts since the 1950s and security concerns in southern Somalia as the main reasons for the crisis. Taken alone, however, these explanations are deeply flawed.
Drought and insecurity certainly contribute to the current crisis, but more fundamental causes are at play. Drought is not a new environmental condition for much of Africa but a recurring one. The semi-arid Horn of Africa and the entire Sahelian region — running just south of the Sahara Desert across the continent — have long experienced erratic rainfall. While climate change may be exacerbating rainfall variability, traditional livelihoods in the region are adaptable to deal with situations when rainfall is not dependable.
The dominant livelihood in the Horn of Africa has long been herding. Traditionally, herders ranged widely across the landscape in search of better pasture, focusing on areas as meteorological conditions dictated. The approach worked because, unlike fenced-in pastures in North America, it was incredibly flexible and adapted to variable rainfall. As farming has expanded, including in some instances to large-scale commercial farms, the routes of herders have become more concentrated and more vulnerable to drought. The change from traditional practices has also become detrimental to the landscape. In Ethiopia, large land leases (or “land grabs”) to foreign governments and companies for export crops (such as palm oil, rice and sugar) have further exacerbated this problem.
Agricultural livelihoods have also evolved in problematic ways. In anticipation of years of poor rainfall, farming households and communities historically stored surplus crop production. Sadly, this traditional strategy for mitigating the risk of drought was undermined from the colonial period, beginning in the late 19th century, as households were encouraged (if not coerced by taxation) to grow cash crops for the market and store less and less excess grain for potential bad years. This increasing market orientation has also been encouraged by development banks. Growing crops for market worked fine as long as cheap and plentiful grain was available for purchase, a trend that began to erode in 2000 as global food prices gradually rose.
Just as death from exposure is not an inherent result of a cold winter, famine is not a natural consequence of drought. Simply put, the structure of human society often determines who is affected and to what degree.
While the nations of the world must act immediately to address the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa, working to ensure prompt delivery and distribution of food aid, these same countries must also consider the underlying causes of the crisis as they seek longer-term solutions. Many, including the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Rajiv Shah, have spoken about the need for a strategy to rebuild food security in the region.
The problem is that the USAID plan for agricultural development in Africa has stressed a “New Green Revolution” involving improved seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. While this energy-intensive approach may make sense in some contexts, it is financially out of reach of the poorest of poor farmers, who are the most likely to face food shortfalls. A more realistic approach would play down imported seeds and commercial agriculture in favor of enhanced traditional approaches to producing food for families and local markets.
Ethiopia, a key recipient of U.S. aid in the Horn of Africa region, should also be strongly discouraged from granting long-term leases of its farmland to foreign entities when it struggles to feed its own people in years of poor rainfall.
Finally, the crisis in the Horn of Africa has been aggravated by high food prices worldwide. Global food prices reached a historic high in February, surpassing the spikes of 2007-08, which had been the highest recorded in 20 years. While current prices are related, in part, to bad weather, other significant factors include high energy prices, the increasing diversion of grain for the production of biofuels, and export restrictions.
With energy and food prices likely to remain high for months to come, Africa can no longer count on cheap imported food or afford to shift to energy-intensive crop production strategies. The path to improved food security lies in improving time-tested local approaches, which are attuned to local environmental conditions.
The writer is a professor of geography and African studies at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minn. He previously worked for Save the Children (UK) on food security issues in Africa.
Friday, 29 July 2011
Did the world react too late to signs of famine in Somalia?
The Economist on the scandal surrounding the famine in Somalia.
Famine has a technical meaning these days. It is declared when 30% of children are acutely malnourished, 20% of the population is without food, and deaths are running at two per 10,000 adults or four per 10,000 children every day. ...
Yet famine was not declared until July, eight months after the first FEWS Net forecast. ...
Outsiders’ caution is linked to the role of the Shabab... The Shabab has banned food aid in most of southern Somalia since 2009, branding Western aid agencies anti-Muslim. The WFP, the biggest provider of food aid, has had 14 staff killed there since 2008. Agencies also worry that militias use food aid to rally their troops—some say this happened in Ethiopia and Eritrea in the 1980s—and do not want to pile into southern Somalia to find they have reinvigorated the Shabab.
... Some, but not all, parts of the Shabab seem to be looking for help. [Chance to split al-Shabaab?]
...
... FEWS Net may have predicted famine but nothing happened until television cameras showed up, beaming out pictures of fragile children arriving at the huge Kenyan refugee camp at Dadaab in large numbers. Aid officers worry about being criticised by the public and their own bosses if they spend scarce resources before there is an outcry. The result is that donors often ignore their own early warnings. “We’re not behaving like good risk managers,” worries Duncan Green, the head of research at Oxfam.
...
Quite apart from the death toll and the misery, this is criminally wasteful. When famine threatened Niger in 2005, the cost of help was put at $7 a head. No one did much; the famine struck; the cost of help ended up at $23 each. Economic incentives and early-warning systems say donors should act early. But the political incentives advise delay—until it is too late.
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