I've long said that policing is the future of war, but the big hunting thing was a new angle in this article.
Faced with an alarming increase in sniper attacks in Iraq, Marine commanders in late 2006 began looking for ways to turn the tables on an elusive enemy. Among the experts they consulted: a renowned African big game hunter and a former big city cop.
The result is the combat hunter program... The training combines outdoor skills culled from hunting and tracking with the street smarts developed by police and Marines who grew up in cities.
"The motto we … try to instill in these guys is Marines are always the hunter, never the hunted," says Ivan Carter, the safari guide and hunter...
...
While much of the military has focused on technology and improved armor to give soldiers an edge in Iraq, the Marine Corps embarked on a different approach with this program, aimed at developing new mind-sets and skills.
...
Marine commanders were also looking for ways to overcome a key advantage insurgents have: They can easily hide among civilians.
"Finding is the problem," Mattis says. "Our soldiers, SEALs and Marines are quite capable of killing these guys. It's how do you find them."
Commanders turned to cops for advice, but they also looked within their own ranks — to Marines who grew up in inner cities.
"The inner-city kid has a unique perspective," says Greg Williams, a retired Detroit area police officer who was recruited by the military to help develop the program. "They have a stronger urban survival instinct. The inner city kid … will see the world a little differently, a little more opportunistically."
...
During a conference at Camp Pendleton last year, Williams and a sergeant took a group of skeptical senior officers for a walk in a nearby town. The sergeant pointed out dangerous neighborhoods based on where cars were parked, whether there were toys in the yards and other signs that they noticed but the older officers did not.
...
Marines can be taught to pick out criminals and insurgents trying to blend into a crowd, if they know what to look for, Williams says.
...
The typical Marine rifleman carries about 97 pounds of equipment... The recommended load is about 50 pounds, according to a Naval Research Advisory Committee report called, "Lightening the Load."
...
"It doesn't mean we're going out there to kill everything we can," Lethin says. "We're hunting the enemy — those insurgents … hiding among the people.
Friday, 15 July 2011
The Perception-centric Approach
Interesting article by Tom Brouns reposted by Mark Sedra.
Rather than a population-centric approach, I recommend a perception-centric approach. That is, all actions undertaken should build a growing perception that success is inevitable for the growing Afghan government. Efforts to curb corruption and enhance legitimacy, transparency, and responsibility are critical to this approach. International development efforts also support this approach, especially if they can somehow be portrayed as the result of efforts and decisions by Afghan leaders. However, the perception-centric approach must also be fully integrated in the military effort – to include policy (think detention and solatia payments), planning (are we seizing terrain or are we demonstrating Afghan capability?) and tactical operations (going beyond mitigation). Former RC South Commander MG Ton van Loon stated, "Every course of action that is likely to antagonize the population should be removed from consideration." To take this a step further, courses of action should be designed from the outset to increase popular support for their government.
Rather than a population-centric approach, I recommend a perception-centric approach. That is, all actions undertaken should build a growing perception that success is inevitable for the growing Afghan government. Efforts to curb corruption and enhance legitimacy, transparency, and responsibility are critical to this approach. International development efforts also support this approach, especially if they can somehow be portrayed as the result of efforts and decisions by Afghan leaders. However, the perception-centric approach must also be fully integrated in the military effort – to include policy (think detention and solatia payments), planning (are we seizing terrain or are we demonstrating Afghan capability?) and tactical operations (going beyond mitigation). Former RC South Commander MG Ton van Loon stated, "Every course of action that is likely to antagonize the population should be removed from consideration." To take this a step further, courses of action should be designed from the outset to increase popular support for their government.
Thursday, 14 July 2011
Towards a Land-Based Solution for Somali Piracy
Rethinking the Cure: Towards a Land-Based Solution for Somali Piracy
Rashid Abdi, Maritime Counter Piracy Conference | 11 Apr 2011
Because the TFG has struggled to steer the process of devolution, impatient local communities in the periphery have, over the last four years, been busy rebuilding the rudiments of regional state institutions, improving inter-communal harmony, and experimenting with a quasi-democratic and consensual style of governance. In this, they are mimicking similar processes in Somaliland and Puntland. It is true, however, that some of these emerging self-governing regional polities are far from stable, and the gains they have made remain highly tenuous and reversible.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the “revolt against the centre,” and attempts to create viable local administrations, are genuine, organic and underpinned by a remarkable degree of popular support — a political development that stands in stark contrast with the hopeless situation in Mogadishu, where a weak and discredited TFG appears out of sync with the wishes and aspirations of its people. While it may not appear immediately obvious, international support for these fragile entities and “recovery” pockets in central and northern Somalia is the best means to banish the piracy menace from Somalia.
Rashid Abdi, Maritime Counter Piracy Conference | 11 Apr 2011
Because the TFG has struggled to steer the process of devolution, impatient local communities in the periphery have, over the last four years, been busy rebuilding the rudiments of regional state institutions, improving inter-communal harmony, and experimenting with a quasi-democratic and consensual style of governance. In this, they are mimicking similar processes in Somaliland and Puntland. It is true, however, that some of these emerging self-governing regional polities are far from stable, and the gains they have made remain highly tenuous and reversible.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the “revolt against the centre,” and attempts to create viable local administrations, are genuine, organic and underpinned by a remarkable degree of popular support — a political development that stands in stark contrast with the hopeless situation in Mogadishu, where a weak and discredited TFG appears out of sync with the wishes and aspirations of its people. While it may not appear immediately obvious, international support for these fragile entities and “recovery” pockets in central and northern Somalia is the best means to banish the piracy menace from Somalia.
Wednesday, 13 July 2011
The future of Australian aid
Article by Annmaree O'Keeffe on the foreign aid review.
Annmaree O'Keeffe is a Lowy Institute research fellow. She has served as Australian Ambassador for HIV/AIDS and Deputy Director General of AusAID.
What sets this framework apart from its predecessors is its emphasis on people rather than states. While the national interest is still incorporated in the overall purpose of the program, it's the humanitarian aspect of aid that gets the bold headline – the fundamental purpose of Australian aid is to help people overcome poverty.
Annmaree O'Keeffe is a Lowy Institute research fellow. She has served as Australian Ambassador for HIV/AIDS and Deputy Director General of AusAID.
What sets this framework apart from its predecessors is its emphasis on people rather than states. While the national interest is still incorporated in the overall purpose of the program, it's the humanitarian aspect of aid that gets the bold headline – the fundamental purpose of Australian aid is to help people overcome poverty.
Tuesday, 12 July 2011
Wars, Guns, and Votes
In a sequel to his award winning book on global poverty The Bottom Billion, Paul Collier comes to the sobering conclusion that democracy can make the poorest countries more dangerous. He also outlines how developed affluent nations can offer assistance to emerging democracies.
Unfortunately, only the transcript and not the audio is available.
The book is here.
Unfortunately, only the transcript and not the audio is available.
The book is here.
Tuesday, 5 July 2011
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
