Stratfor's Friedman and Kaplan on COIN:
Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts
Wednesday, 20 June 2012
Friday, 10 February 2012
In Helmand, training Afghan Local Police is a challenge
KHAR NIKAH, Afghanistan — Inside a cold room surrounded by sand-filled Hesco barriers in the remote Gereshk Valley, British forces are teaching a group of young Afghan fighters how to protect their village from the Taliban.
But preparing a group of angry, illiterate Afghans to fight a deadly enemy that is regularly testing the British forces here in northern Helmand Province is a monumental task. The villagers who have opted to join the Afghan Local Police force in Khar Nikah mistrust one another, say they are not being offered much pay and complain that they need better weapons.
...
Local defense programs have become a vital part of military strategy in Afghanistan. The programs began after an incident in summer 2010 when dozens of rifle-toting farmers from Gizab, a strategically important area in Kandahar, drove the Taliban from their village. Following that successful local uprising, the United States was keen to replicate the model for village defense, and the United States has since sent in troops to train local villagers.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-helmand-training-afghan-local-police-is-a-challenge/2012/01/23/gIQAokHm3Q_story.html
But preparing a group of angry, illiterate Afghans to fight a deadly enemy that is regularly testing the British forces here in northern Helmand Province is a monumental task. The villagers who have opted to join the Afghan Local Police force in Khar Nikah mistrust one another, say they are not being offered much pay and complain that they need better weapons.
...
Local defense programs have become a vital part of military strategy in Afghanistan. The programs began after an incident in summer 2010 when dozens of rifle-toting farmers from Gizab, a strategically important area in Kandahar, drove the Taliban from their village. Following that successful local uprising, the United States was keen to replicate the model for village defense, and the United States has since sent in troops to train local villagers.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-helmand-training-afghan-local-police-is-a-challenge/2012/01/23/gIQAokHm3Q_story.html
Wednesday, 28 December 2011
Fighting Small Wars In The New Century
The offering of inducements manifestly does little to improve the political trajectory on the ground. All wars are ultimately decided by the re-distribution of political power and that is in turn decided by the bargaining power that each of the belligerents brings to the negotiating table. This essay argues that the same unifying hedgehog idea, annihilation, is equally applicable to countering insurgencies and is the only available mechanism to resolve the complexity we face. Annihilation can be aggressive operations to destroy the military capacity of the insurgents or to deny insurgents the opportunity to apply its military capacity to the population. Both are paths to the establishment of control over the operating environment. There will be a time when reconstruction and other aid will begin to produce dividends and that time will be marked by the establishment of security.
Link to paper here.
Link to paper here.
COIN a la carte
Kilcullen on elements of COIN being used to counter the narcotics war:
* Law enforcement
* Military operations
* Intelligence sharing: ... The United States has reportedly helped Mexico create and run two intelligence “fusion cells” aimed at tracking down cartel leaders.
* Whole-of-government approach: ... In 2009, the State Department, with input from eight other agencies and departments, published the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide.
* “Emergency” extradition procedures
* Law enforcement
* Military operations
* Intelligence sharing: ... The United States has reportedly helped Mexico create and run two intelligence “fusion cells” aimed at tracking down cartel leaders.
* Whole-of-government approach: ... In 2009, the State Department, with input from eight other agencies and departments, published the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide.
* “Emergency” extradition procedures
Wednesday, 7 December 2011
One Team’s Approach to Village Stability Operations
One Team’s Approach to Village Stability Operations
by Rory Hanlin
Journal Article | September 4, 2011 - 11:55pm, Updated: September 13, 2011 - 05:30am
Fascinating article.
by Rory Hanlin
Journal Article | September 4, 2011 - 11:55pm, Updated: September 13, 2011 - 05:30am
"If you have seen one VSO, you have seen one VSO."
This paper is an effort to demonstrate my team’s approach to VSO using the principles and TTPs that numerous articles have recently highlighted in the July-September issue of Special Warfare Magazine.
...
...progress along the VSO shape-hold-build-transition/expansion model is inhibited by 3 key factors: a defunct system of governance, a divided population, and an under-developed economy based in subsistence farming. These factors collude to form a survivalist culture with a zero-sum worldview.
...
Fascinating article.
Tuesday, 6 December 2011
Historical Lessons on Local Defense in Counterinsurgency
Formalizing the Informal: Historical Lessons on Local Defense in Counterinsurgency
by Matthew P. Dearing
Journal Article | December 1, 2011 - 11:04pm
In September, Human Rights Watch released a scathing report on the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a paramilitary institution under control of the Minister of Interior and being trained by US Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. ... These lessons suggest that paramilitary groups require: 1) supervision from state sponsors; 2) broad and deep cutting institutional reach; and 3) support from path dependent models.
...
...First, even in environments of "softened sovereignty," the vast majority of paramilitary groups are organized by, or with consent of the state in order to act as a force multiplier and an economy of force in support of military or law enforcement operations. While state-sponsored militias are supportive of the state, they also represent a form of contentious politics that use violence as a means to "protect the established order as opposed to overthrowing it."
Second, David Kilcullen suggests that in an insurgency, when the state is facing an existential threat, authority "flows away from civilian leaders at the level of the central or national state, toward local armed leaders, and toward the village or tribal level." Such leaders are empowered with legitimacy from the state; they are "embedded" within the local social system, and are given increasing authority as the conflict persists. These cases provide examples of weak states, facing intra-state war, attempting to quell insurgency in areas that were alternatively governed. Its important to keep in mind a major difference between these cases and Afghanistan, that is, liberal peace theory did not play a part in the state-building efforts such as it has in Afghanistan.
One of the first lessons is the role of the state as a supervisor and supporter of local capacity-building initiatives.
A second lesson is that national paramilitary organizations should be incorporated into broad umbrella institutions that represent civic objectives and enable legitimate controlling processes over diverse violence wielders.
A third lesson is the historical role of paramilitarism in areas of alternative governance.
A final lesson is based upon planning for future operations. ...there will be greater reliance on paramilitary organizations and the value they provide as local state-builders.
by Matthew P. Dearing
Journal Article | December 1, 2011 - 11:04pm
In September, Human Rights Watch released a scathing report on the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a paramilitary institution under control of the Minister of Interior and being trained by US Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. ... These lessons suggest that paramilitary groups require: 1) supervision from state sponsors; 2) broad and deep cutting institutional reach; and 3) support from path dependent models.
...
...First, even in environments of "softened sovereignty," the vast majority of paramilitary groups are organized by, or with consent of the state in order to act as a force multiplier and an economy of force in support of military or law enforcement operations. While state-sponsored militias are supportive of the state, they also represent a form of contentious politics that use violence as a means to "protect the established order as opposed to overthrowing it."
Second, David Kilcullen suggests that in an insurgency, when the state is facing an existential threat, authority "flows away from civilian leaders at the level of the central or national state, toward local armed leaders, and toward the village or tribal level." Such leaders are empowered with legitimacy from the state; they are "embedded" within the local social system, and are given increasing authority as the conflict persists. These cases provide examples of weak states, facing intra-state war, attempting to quell insurgency in areas that were alternatively governed. Its important to keep in mind a major difference between these cases and Afghanistan, that is, liberal peace theory did not play a part in the state-building efforts such as it has in Afghanistan.
One of the first lessons is the role of the state as a supervisor and supporter of local capacity-building initiatives.
A second lesson is that national paramilitary organizations should be incorporated into broad umbrella institutions that represent civic objectives and enable legitimate controlling processes over diverse violence wielders.
A third lesson is the historical role of paramilitarism in areas of alternative governance.
A final lesson is based upon planning for future operations. ...there will be greater reliance on paramilitary organizations and the value they provide as local state-builders.
Friday, 2 December 2011
How Afghanization Can Work
How Afghanization Can Work
Linda Robinson, Adjunct Senior Fellow for U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy
December 2, 2011
Option 1: Big COIN
* maintain the 68K US troops + as many NATO troops as possible
* counterinsurgency campaign
* successful so far
* non-viable: NATO reluctant
* zero-sum environment: funds spent on military efforts will sap funding available for civilian development assistance
Option 2: Counterterrorism
* counterterrorism is rarely effective as a freestanding approach and tends to produce negative political effects when wielded unilaterally.
Option 3: Afghan-led Counterinsurgency
The most desirable approach is one that puts Afghanistan firmly in the lead of its own counterinsurgency and nation-building effort, with the United States and international partners and donors in support. ... To paraphrase T.E. Lawrence, it is far better that those facing the insurgency do it themselves, however poorly.
What would an Afghan-led counterinsurgency campaign look like?
* Afghan forces would take over in all but the most conflicted areas of the country. * * The U.S. and allied support to the Afghan counterinsurgency should be almost exclusively focused on the south and east where the Taliban insurgency is strong, and in particular Kandahar and the eastern "P2K" provinces (Paktia, Paktika, and especially Khost).
* A very small node can remain in the west in Shindand
* the same can be done in the critical Salang Tunnel corridor in the north.
* reduced dramatically to a few high-level officers
* The command for training Afghan security forces should be primarily manned by Afghan trainers.
* Most of the troops would be embedded advisers, largely from the special operations community but augmented by conventional forces that are selected and trained for the mission.
* focus on supporting community defense and police, which have been egregiously neglected throughout the war.
* Eighty-eight of 265 Afghan police units in key areas (PDF) currently have no mentor at all.
How many U.S. forces would be required to support this "small COIN" option?
* A robust effort could be mounted with forty thousand troops, declining to twenty thousand or fewer as the Afghans become more proficient.
* embedded advisers
* about half of the personnel would provide support. Distributed operations in Afghanistan require substantial air lift, combat aviation, ISR, and logistics support
* the best way to defeat the ubiquitous buried bombs is foot patrols and Kawasaki all-terrain vehicles for off-road travel
How long would the United States have to support a twenty-thousand-strong COIN effort?
It is hard to say, but not longer than a decade, and the numbers would progressively decline to a few thousand as Afghans gain experience and as the insurgency shrinks. As the insurgency weakens, the current talks, best described as "pre-negotiations," are likely to gather steam as fighters realize the government will not collapse. The end of the war is likely to come a piece at a time, as insurgent factions peel off and reject the authority of Taliban leaders ensconced in Pakistan.
Is there a precedent for such an approach?
* El Salvador, Colombia, the Philippines
* El Salvador in the 1980s with fifty-five Special Forces trainers plus a robust country team with USAID, State, and intelligence officials who were dispersed around the country.
Linda Robinson, Adjunct Senior Fellow for U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy
December 2, 2011
Option 1: Big COIN
* maintain the 68K US troops + as many NATO troops as possible
* counterinsurgency campaign
* successful so far
* non-viable: NATO reluctant
* zero-sum environment: funds spent on military efforts will sap funding available for civilian development assistance
Option 2: Counterterrorism
* counterterrorism is rarely effective as a freestanding approach and tends to produce negative political effects when wielded unilaterally.
Option 3: Afghan-led Counterinsurgency
The most desirable approach is one that puts Afghanistan firmly in the lead of its own counterinsurgency and nation-building effort, with the United States and international partners and donors in support. ... To paraphrase T.E. Lawrence, it is far better that those facing the insurgency do it themselves, however poorly.
What would an Afghan-led counterinsurgency campaign look like?
* Afghan forces would take over in all but the most conflicted areas of the country. * * The U.S. and allied support to the Afghan counterinsurgency should be almost exclusively focused on the south and east where the Taliban insurgency is strong, and in particular Kandahar and the eastern "P2K" provinces (Paktia, Paktika, and especially Khost).
* A very small node can remain in the west in Shindand
* the same can be done in the critical Salang Tunnel corridor in the north.
* reduced dramatically to a few high-level officers
* The command for training Afghan security forces should be primarily manned by Afghan trainers.
* Most of the troops would be embedded advisers, largely from the special operations community but augmented by conventional forces that are selected and trained for the mission.
* focus on supporting community defense and police, which have been egregiously neglected throughout the war.
* Eighty-eight of 265 Afghan police units in key areas (PDF) currently have no mentor at all.
How many U.S. forces would be required to support this "small COIN" option?
* A robust effort could be mounted with forty thousand troops, declining to twenty thousand or fewer as the Afghans become more proficient.
* embedded advisers
* about half of the personnel would provide support. Distributed operations in Afghanistan require substantial air lift, combat aviation, ISR, and logistics support
* the best way to defeat the ubiquitous buried bombs is foot patrols and Kawasaki all-terrain vehicles for off-road travel
How long would the United States have to support a twenty-thousand-strong COIN effort?
It is hard to say, but not longer than a decade, and the numbers would progressively decline to a few thousand as Afghans gain experience and as the insurgency shrinks. As the insurgency weakens, the current talks, best described as "pre-negotiations," are likely to gather steam as fighters realize the government will not collapse. The end of the war is likely to come a piece at a time, as insurgent factions peel off and reject the authority of Taliban leaders ensconced in Pakistan.
Is there a precedent for such an approach?
* El Salvador, Colombia, the Philippines
* El Salvador in the 1980s with fifty-five Special Forces trainers plus a robust country team with USAID, State, and intelligence officials who were dispersed around the country.
Center for Advanced Defense Studies
Having read Operation Dark Heart, I looked up the author's new home, the Center for Advanced Defense Studies.
Looks interesting.
Review of the book to follow.
Looks interesting.
Review of the book to follow.
Saturday, 24 September 2011
David Kilcullen and Julian Burnside on Tactics in the Iraq War
Here, in a brilliant discussion with human rights lawyer Julian Burnside at the Melbourne Writers Festival, [Kilcullen] talks about the ethics and tactics of contemporary warfare.
Wednesday, 21 September 2011
Nagl Interview
Nagl in an IDGA.org/defenceiq.com On Point interview:
Two pillars of FM 3-24:
1. Protect the population first
2. Be adaptable
and also:
3. Use all elements of national power in a co-ordinated way. Galula said COIN is only 25% military.
Two pillars of FM 3-24:
1. Protect the population first
2. Be adaptable
and also:
3. Use all elements of national power in a co-ordinated way. Galula said COIN is only 25% military.
Monday, 19 September 2011
Immortal Insurgencies
by Anthony Vinci
Abstract
This article makes the case that knowing how insurgencies last so long can help to understand why they last so long. Moreover, it argues that only by answering the ‘how’ question that we can develop better means of defeating the insurgent temporal attrition strategy. Insurgencies can seem immortal because they develop adaptive, self-perpetuating solutions to the ‘problems of mobilization’, which are a set of actions that every armed group must be able to perform in order to mobilize for war. When insurgencies have developed such adaptive solutions they can be very difficult to defeat because the group may adapt to any immediate destruction of one of its functions. The means to defeat insurgencies lies in considering the second order consequences of how one action may lead the group to adapt. Then the strategy demands choosing those actions that will leave the group weaker in the long run.
Abstract
This article makes the case that knowing how insurgencies last so long can help to understand why they last so long. Moreover, it argues that only by answering the ‘how’ question that we can develop better means of defeating the insurgent temporal attrition strategy. Insurgencies can seem immortal because they develop adaptive, self-perpetuating solutions to the ‘problems of mobilization’, which are a set of actions that every armed group must be able to perform in order to mobilize for war. When insurgencies have developed such adaptive solutions they can be very difficult to defeat because the group may adapt to any immediate destruction of one of its functions. The means to defeat insurgencies lies in considering the second order consequences of how one action may lead the group to adapt. Then the strategy demands choosing those actions that will leave the group weaker in the long run.
Saturday, 3 September 2011
Evidentiary Validation of FM 3-24
Evidentiary Validation of FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Worldwide, 1978-2008
By Christopher Paul and Colin P. Clarke
By Christopher Paul and Colin P. Clarke
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers
Book:
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency
by Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency
by Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill
Tuesday, 2 August 2011
Sunday, 31 July 2011
The Moro War: An Insurgency and Its Lessons
Review of The Moro War by Mark Moyar, the author of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq.
Some key points (I've pruned, but not much - there was so much good stuff.)
The Americans in Moroland outlawed slavery and polygamy. The governors required Moro children to attend secular schools instead of Islamic ones. To halt rampant armed robbery, the administrators compelled every Moro man to surrender his sword. Mr. Arnold concedes that, despite some protestation, many Moros liked the American policies and beseeched the U.S. to delay plans for their self-rule.
Other aspects of the Moro War, though, bear close resemblance to recent Islamic insurgencies. In Moroland as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. introduced Western principles of law, government and education without explaining to Muslims how such principles were consistent with the Quran. Religiously motivated violence resulted.
"The Moros saw American military restraint as weakness," he writes. "The Moro understanding of Mohammed's life story taught that a party engaged in diplomacy merely to buy time to recover from setback."
Early counterinsurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from the same ignorance. Western nations, impatient to appear benevolent and remove their troops, showed a reluctance to use force and an eagerness to negotiate that conveyed weakness. Some Western policy makers still have not grasped that displaying an eagerness to use force and a reluctance to negotiate offers the most promising route to peace. ["Be prepared to kill"]
But other officers, like Tasker Bliss and John Pershing, defused crises by first talking with local leaders. Sometimes the Moros backed down when confronted by stern talk and the threat of force. Sometimes they did not and had to be given what Pershing called "a good sound drubbing." By talking before shooting, Americans increased U.S. influence, building personal relationships and demonstrating a commitment to impartial justice.
When Americans stepped in, they were able to resolve Moro legal clashes fairly, gaining respect. One officer explained that spending days in the heat hearing testimony about the contested ownership of a buffalo "seemed at times to be without purpose and without result," but "the results in the end were prodigious; nothing less than the trust, confidence, and affection of the huge majority of the Moro people."
As Mr. Arnold notes, the patience, knowledge and talent required for prolonged dealings with the Moros were scarce commodities. It was a good thing, one officer remarked, that Gen. Pershing was put in charge instead of "some fool officer who ignorantly supposed that he could come and in an off-hand manner manage these savages."
Proper qualifications are as scarce now as then. Thus assigning the right Americans to work with Afghans will rank among the U.S.'s greatest challenges in the coming years. From the start, a respect for Afghan sovereignty has required U.S. officials to rely heavily on personal influence and negotiation to get Afghans to do the right thing. That reliance will only increase as the reduction in America's presence brings Afghan stewardship to the fore.
Some key points (I've pruned, but not much - there was so much good stuff.)
The Americans in Moroland outlawed slavery and polygamy. The governors required Moro children to attend secular schools instead of Islamic ones. To halt rampant armed robbery, the administrators compelled every Moro man to surrender his sword. Mr. Arnold concedes that, despite some protestation, many Moros liked the American policies and beseeched the U.S. to delay plans for their self-rule.
Other aspects of the Moro War, though, bear close resemblance to recent Islamic insurgencies. In Moroland as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. introduced Western principles of law, government and education without explaining to Muslims how such principles were consistent with the Quran. Religiously motivated violence resulted.
"The Moros saw American military restraint as weakness," he writes. "The Moro understanding of Mohammed's life story taught that a party engaged in diplomacy merely to buy time to recover from setback."
Early counterinsurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from the same ignorance. Western nations, impatient to appear benevolent and remove their troops, showed a reluctance to use force and an eagerness to negotiate that conveyed weakness. Some Western policy makers still have not grasped that displaying an eagerness to use force and a reluctance to negotiate offers the most promising route to peace. ["Be prepared to kill"]
But other officers, like Tasker Bliss and John Pershing, defused crises by first talking with local leaders. Sometimes the Moros backed down when confronted by stern talk and the threat of force. Sometimes they did not and had to be given what Pershing called "a good sound drubbing." By talking before shooting, Americans increased U.S. influence, building personal relationships and demonstrating a commitment to impartial justice.
When Americans stepped in, they were able to resolve Moro legal clashes fairly, gaining respect. One officer explained that spending days in the heat hearing testimony about the contested ownership of a buffalo "seemed at times to be without purpose and without result," but "the results in the end were prodigious; nothing less than the trust, confidence, and affection of the huge majority of the Moro people."
As Mr. Arnold notes, the patience, knowledge and talent required for prolonged dealings with the Moros were scarce commodities. It was a good thing, one officer remarked, that Gen. Pershing was put in charge instead of "some fool officer who ignorantly supposed that he could come and in an off-hand manner manage these savages."
Proper qualifications are as scarce now as then. Thus assigning the right Americans to work with Afghans will rank among the U.S.'s greatest challenges in the coming years. From the start, a respect for Afghan sovereignty has required U.S. officials to rely heavily on personal influence and negotiation to get Afghans to do the right thing. That reliance will only increase as the reduction in America's presence brings Afghan stewardship to the fore.
Sunday, 24 July 2011
Our undeserved COIN reputation
Jim Molan on COIN.
When Dr Milton Osborne was writing his Lowy Perspectives Paper, Getting the Job Done: Iraq and the Malayan Emergency, in February 2005, I was trying to do counter-insurgency in Iraq, and I could really have used that paper.
...
I never met anyone in any position of authority who said that success in these wars could be achieved by military forces alone, but the creation of relative security for the people by the use of military or para-military forces is the first and most essential step.
When Dr Milton Osborne was writing his Lowy Perspectives Paper, Getting the Job Done: Iraq and the Malayan Emergency, in February 2005, I was trying to do counter-insurgency in Iraq, and I could really have used that paper.
...
I never met anyone in any position of authority who said that success in these wars could be achieved by military forces alone, but the creation of relative security for the people by the use of military or para-military forces is the first and most essential step.
Saturday, 16 July 2011
Friday, 15 July 2011
Sangin Province: What Worked
What Worked
A. Military successes stimulated reconciliation and population mobilization. The population-centric COIN that preceded the Marines had relied on political outreach and economic development to convince Sangin’s residents to abandon the insurgency and join the government side. Military force was minimized based on the theory that violence would create “accidental guerrillas,” kill off potential negotiating partners and alienate the insurgents so much that they would never consider reconciling with the government. This approach accomplished little. In fact, the counterinsurgents’ aversion to the use of force and their eagerness to negotiate most likely discouraged a political compromise because they suggested that the insurgents could win a complete victory by waiting the foreigners out. As it turned out, the Marines made much greater progress in reconciliation and population mobilization because their military successes raised the costs in lives and property that communities and families paid for supporting the insurgency and convinced the opportunists that the coalition would prevail.
B. The Marines put stabilization ahead of transition. Preceding military commanders and civilian officials had sought to facilitate transition by assigning greater responsibility to Afghans. The Marines concluded that the enemy was too strong and the Afghan government too weak to permit a successful transition under these conditions. Instead, they decided to take the lead in security operations in order to set the conditions for ultimate success. By reducing violence and permitting government officials freedom of movement, they put the government on a viable path to sustainable transition. This shift in approach mirrored the shift in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, when initial efforts to transition responsibility to Iraqis failed so spectacularly that the Americans chose to retake the lead in security until the situation stabilized. In both instances, a de-emphasis on transition actually improved the prospects for transition and shortened the amount of time required for a successful handover.
C. Development aid was provided only when coalition personnel could visit the projects. The Marines stopped the funding of development projects in areas that could not be visited. This shift ensured that coalition personnel could verify firsthand whether projects were proceeding as intended, and disabused Afghans of the notion that the coalition was a collection of suckers. The Marine willingness to operate throughout the district greatly facilitated on-site inspections.
D. Counternarcotics took a back seat to stabilization. The Marines decided that they had too many enemies already to engage in large-scale counternarcotics activities. Much of the population depended on the opium industry for its livelihood, and could be expected to cling to insurgency more strongly if that livelihood were at stake. Counternarcotics could wait until the government had enough personnel and adequate security to undertake robust counternarcotics measures. Marine COIN operations did, however, have a large impact on the narcotics trade because many of the insurgents they captured or killed had been involved in it. Nevertheless, the narcotics industry continues to thrive in Sangin, and it now poses a vexing problem across Helmand, for the power brokers required for reconciliation, and at some level the officials of the Afghan government, are deeply invested in it will strongly resist actions that would harm the narcotics business.
A. Military successes stimulated reconciliation and population mobilization. The population-centric COIN that preceded the Marines had relied on political outreach and economic development to convince Sangin’s residents to abandon the insurgency and join the government side. Military force was minimized based on the theory that violence would create “accidental guerrillas,” kill off potential negotiating partners and alienate the insurgents so much that they would never consider reconciling with the government. This approach accomplished little. In fact, the counterinsurgents’ aversion to the use of force and their eagerness to negotiate most likely discouraged a political compromise because they suggested that the insurgents could win a complete victory by waiting the foreigners out. As it turned out, the Marines made much greater progress in reconciliation and population mobilization because their military successes raised the costs in lives and property that communities and families paid for supporting the insurgency and convinced the opportunists that the coalition would prevail.
B. The Marines put stabilization ahead of transition. Preceding military commanders and civilian officials had sought to facilitate transition by assigning greater responsibility to Afghans. The Marines concluded that the enemy was too strong and the Afghan government too weak to permit a successful transition under these conditions. Instead, they decided to take the lead in security operations in order to set the conditions for ultimate success. By reducing violence and permitting government officials freedom of movement, they put the government on a viable path to sustainable transition. This shift in approach mirrored the shift in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, when initial efforts to transition responsibility to Iraqis failed so spectacularly that the Americans chose to retake the lead in security until the situation stabilized. In both instances, a de-emphasis on transition actually improved the prospects for transition and shortened the amount of time required for a successful handover.
C. Development aid was provided only when coalition personnel could visit the projects. The Marines stopped the funding of development projects in areas that could not be visited. This shift ensured that coalition personnel could verify firsthand whether projects were proceeding as intended, and disabused Afghans of the notion that the coalition was a collection of suckers. The Marine willingness to operate throughout the district greatly facilitated on-site inspections.
D. Counternarcotics took a back seat to stabilization. The Marines decided that they had too many enemies already to engage in large-scale counternarcotics activities. Much of the population depended on the opium industry for its livelihood, and could be expected to cling to insurgency more strongly if that livelihood were at stake. Counternarcotics could wait until the government had enough personnel and adequate security to undertake robust counternarcotics measures. Marine COIN operations did, however, have a large impact on the narcotics trade because many of the insurgents they captured or killed had been involved in it. Nevertheless, the narcotics industry continues to thrive in Sangin, and it now poses a vexing problem across Helmand, for the power brokers required for reconciliation, and at some level the officials of the Afghan government, are deeply invested in it will strongly resist actions that would harm the narcotics business.
Combat Hunter Program
I've long said that policing is the future of war, but the big hunting thing was a new angle in this article.
Faced with an alarming increase in sniper attacks in Iraq, Marine commanders in late 2006 began looking for ways to turn the tables on an elusive enemy. Among the experts they consulted: a renowned African big game hunter and a former big city cop.
The result is the combat hunter program... The training combines outdoor skills culled from hunting and tracking with the street smarts developed by police and Marines who grew up in cities.
"The motto we … try to instill in these guys is Marines are always the hunter, never the hunted," says Ivan Carter, the safari guide and hunter...
...
While much of the military has focused on technology and improved armor to give soldiers an edge in Iraq, the Marine Corps embarked on a different approach with this program, aimed at developing new mind-sets and skills.
...
Marine commanders were also looking for ways to overcome a key advantage insurgents have: They can easily hide among civilians.
"Finding is the problem," Mattis says. "Our soldiers, SEALs and Marines are quite capable of killing these guys. It's how do you find them."
Commanders turned to cops for advice, but they also looked within their own ranks — to Marines who grew up in inner cities.
"The inner-city kid has a unique perspective," says Greg Williams, a retired Detroit area police officer who was recruited by the military to help develop the program. "They have a stronger urban survival instinct. The inner city kid … will see the world a little differently, a little more opportunistically."
...
During a conference at Camp Pendleton last year, Williams and a sergeant took a group of skeptical senior officers for a walk in a nearby town. The sergeant pointed out dangerous neighborhoods based on where cars were parked, whether there were toys in the yards and other signs that they noticed but the older officers did not.
...
Marines can be taught to pick out criminals and insurgents trying to blend into a crowd, if they know what to look for, Williams says.
...
The typical Marine rifleman carries about 97 pounds of equipment... The recommended load is about 50 pounds, according to a Naval Research Advisory Committee report called, "Lightening the Load."
...
"It doesn't mean we're going out there to kill everything we can," Lethin says. "We're hunting the enemy — those insurgents … hiding among the people.
Faced with an alarming increase in sniper attacks in Iraq, Marine commanders in late 2006 began looking for ways to turn the tables on an elusive enemy. Among the experts they consulted: a renowned African big game hunter and a former big city cop.
The result is the combat hunter program... The training combines outdoor skills culled from hunting and tracking with the street smarts developed by police and Marines who grew up in cities.
"The motto we … try to instill in these guys is Marines are always the hunter, never the hunted," says Ivan Carter, the safari guide and hunter...
...
While much of the military has focused on technology and improved armor to give soldiers an edge in Iraq, the Marine Corps embarked on a different approach with this program, aimed at developing new mind-sets and skills.
...
Marine commanders were also looking for ways to overcome a key advantage insurgents have: They can easily hide among civilians.
"Finding is the problem," Mattis says. "Our soldiers, SEALs and Marines are quite capable of killing these guys. It's how do you find them."
Commanders turned to cops for advice, but they also looked within their own ranks — to Marines who grew up in inner cities.
"The inner-city kid has a unique perspective," says Greg Williams, a retired Detroit area police officer who was recruited by the military to help develop the program. "They have a stronger urban survival instinct. The inner city kid … will see the world a little differently, a little more opportunistically."
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During a conference at Camp Pendleton last year, Williams and a sergeant took a group of skeptical senior officers for a walk in a nearby town. The sergeant pointed out dangerous neighborhoods based on where cars were parked, whether there were toys in the yards and other signs that they noticed but the older officers did not.
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Marines can be taught to pick out criminals and insurgents trying to blend into a crowd, if they know what to look for, Williams says.
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The typical Marine rifleman carries about 97 pounds of equipment... The recommended load is about 50 pounds, according to a Naval Research Advisory Committee report called, "Lightening the Load."
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"It doesn't mean we're going out there to kill everything we can," Lethin says. "We're hunting the enemy — those insurgents … hiding among the people.
The Perception-centric Approach
Interesting article by Tom Brouns reposted by Mark Sedra.
Rather than a population-centric approach, I recommend a perception-centric approach. That is, all actions undertaken should build a growing perception that success is inevitable for the growing Afghan government. Efforts to curb corruption and enhance legitimacy, transparency, and responsibility are critical to this approach. International development efforts also support this approach, especially if they can somehow be portrayed as the result of efforts and decisions by Afghan leaders. However, the perception-centric approach must also be fully integrated in the military effort – to include policy (think detention and solatia payments), planning (are we seizing terrain or are we demonstrating Afghan capability?) and tactical operations (going beyond mitigation). Former RC South Commander MG Ton van Loon stated, "Every course of action that is likely to antagonize the population should be removed from consideration." To take this a step further, courses of action should be designed from the outset to increase popular support for their government.
Rather than a population-centric approach, I recommend a perception-centric approach. That is, all actions undertaken should build a growing perception that success is inevitable for the growing Afghan government. Efforts to curb corruption and enhance legitimacy, transparency, and responsibility are critical to this approach. International development efforts also support this approach, especially if they can somehow be portrayed as the result of efforts and decisions by Afghan leaders. However, the perception-centric approach must also be fully integrated in the military effort – to include policy (think detention and solatia payments), planning (are we seizing terrain or are we demonstrating Afghan capability?) and tactical operations (going beyond mitigation). Former RC South Commander MG Ton van Loon stated, "Every course of action that is likely to antagonize the population should be removed from consideration." To take this a step further, courses of action should be designed from the outset to increase popular support for their government.
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