The Dictator's Inner Circle

From the National Bureau of Economic Research:

We posit the problem of an autocrat who has to allocate access to the executive positions in his inner circle and define the career profile of his own insiders. Statically, granting access to an executive post to a more experienced subordinate increases political returns to the post, but is more threatening to the leader in case of a coup. Dynamically, the leader monitors the capacity of staging a coup by his subordinates, which grows over time, and the incentives of trading a subordinate’s own position for a potential shot at the leadership, which defines the incentives of staging a palace coup for each member of the inner circle. We map these theoretical elements into structurally estimable hazard functions of terminations of cabinet ministers for a panel of postcolonial Sub-Saharan African countries. The hazard functions initially increase over time, indicating that most government insiders quickly wear out their welcome, and then drop once the minister is fully entrenched in the current regime. We argue that the survival concerns of the leader in granting access to his inner circle can cover much ground in explaining the widespread lack of competence of African governments and the vast heterogeneity of political performance between and within these regimes.

Authors: Patrick Francois, Ilia Rainer, Francesco Trebbi

NBER Working Paper No. 20216
June 2014

Hat-tip: The Interpreter

Saracen's shenanigans in Puntland

Abdiweli Ali Gaas who is now a MP of the Somalia’s Federal Parliament, refused to comment on the reports that the Puntland President’s son Mohamed Farole has sent forces trained by Saracen to surround his residence, during his visit in Bosaso the commercial capital of Puntland.

Last week, hundreds of the Puntland’s Maritime Police Force surrounded the villa Mr.Gaas was staying in Bosaso city, completely blocking all the roads leading to the residence. These forces are trained by a company called Sterling Corporate Services also known as Saracen.

The forces later abandoned their positions after local residents and armed militias supporting the former Prime minister gathered near his home in Bosaso.

Recently, the Controversial South African private military operator Sterling Corporate Services, aka Saracen International, has lost its anti-piracy contract in the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland.

Saracen embroiled in Puntland politics?

From this report from Somaliland Press:

Abdiweli Ali Gaas who is now a MP of the Somalia’s Federal Parliament, refused to comment on the reports that the Puntland President’s son Mohamed Farole has sent forces trained by Saracen to surround his residence, during his visit in Bosaso the commercial capital of Puntland. 

Last week, hundreds of the Puntland’s Maritime Police Force surrounded the villa Mr.Gaas was staying in Bosaso city, completely blocking all the roads leading to the residence. These forces are trained by a company called Sterling Corporate Services also known as Saracen. 

The forces later abandoned their positions after local residents and armed militias supporting the former Prime minister gathered near his home in Bosaso. 

Recently, the Controversial South African private military operator Sterling Corporate Services, aka Saracen International, has lost its anti-piracy contract in the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland.

Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)

The Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) identifies, compiles, and analyzes micro-level conflict data and information on insurgency, civil war, and other sources of politically motivated violence worldwide. ESOC empowers the nation’s best minds with the quality of data and information needed to address some of the most enduring and pressing challenges to international security. Ultimately, ESOC is committed to providing war fighters and policy makers with greater expert analyses and recommendations for responding to security threats.

Military needs to equip for COIN

From a speech by General Sir David Richards at the IISS (back in 2010):

3. Defence must respond to the new strategic, and indeed economic, environment by ensuring much more ruthlessly that our armed forces are appropriate and relevant to the context in which they will operate rather than the one they might have expected to fight in in previous eras. Too much emphasis is still placed on what Secretary Gates calls ‘exquisite’ and hugely expensive equipment. 4. - Our Defence establishment has not yet fully adapted to the security realities of the post-Cold War world and this complex and dangerous new century. US defence analyst David Wood recently described the US defence budget as encrusted with an "we've always done it this way'' convention and strategic choices attuned to the last century. - Operating among, understanding and effectively influencing people requires mass - numbers - whether this is ‘boots on the ground’, riverine and high speed littoral warships, or UAVs, transport aircraft and helicopters. They have to be able to fight but this is no longer sufficient. No nation is any better than the US in this respect and nearly all are far worse. 5. If one equips more for this type of conflict while significantly reducing investment in higher-end war-fighting capability, suddenly one can buy an impressive amount of ‘kit’. Whilst, as you will hear, I am emphatically not advocating getting rid of all such equipment, one can buy a lot of UAVs or Tucano aircraft for the cost of a few JSF and heavy tanks. 6.  - Can we take the risk? Well we have to take risk somewhere or run the far greater one of trying with inadequate resources to be all things to all conflicts and failing to succeed in any. Why this area of traditional state on state war though? - Having learnt the lessons taught by AQ, the Taliban and many other non-state actors, and thought how to exploit them perhaps on an ‘industrial’ scale, why would even a major belligerent state choose to achieve our downfall though high risk, high cost traditional means when they can plausibly achieve their aims, much more cheaply and semi-anonymously, using proxies, guerrillas, economic subterfuge and cyber warfare?

Even the generals are saying it.

Fabius Maximus's COIN reading list

Two lists by Fabius Maximus: one on the failure of COIN and the other on insurgencies against foreign armies:

Posts about COIN:

1. More paths to failure in Iraq, 16 December 2006 — Myths about COIN in Iraq
2. 28 Articles: a guide to a successful insurgency against America, 7 May 2007
3. Is COIN the graduate level of military hubris?, 30 July 2008
4. COIN as future generations will see it (and as we should see it today), 1 July 2010
5. COIN – Now we see that it failed. But that was obvious before we started (when will we learn?), 6 December 2011
6. COIN, another example of our difficulty learning from history or experience, 7 December 2011
7. “COIN of the Realm” – reviewing one of the books driving our strategy in the Long War, 18 March 2012 — Review of Nagl’s How to Eat Soup with a Knife
8. A look back at the madness that led us into our wars. How does this advice read 6 years later?, 26 June 2012

The history of foreign armies fighting local insurgents:

1. How often do insurgents win?  How much time does successful COIN require?, 29 May 2008
2. Max Boot: history suggests we will win in Afghanistan, with better than 50-50 odds. Here’s the real story., 21 June 2010 — Boot discusses 7 alleged victories by foreign armies fighting insurgencies.
3. A major discovery! It could change the course of US geopolitical strategy, if we’d only see it, 28 June 2010 — Andrew Exum (aka Abu Muqawama) points us to the doctoral dissertation of Erin Marie Simpson in Political Science from Harvard.  She examines the present and past analysis of  counter-insurgency.  This could change the course of American foreign policy, if we pay attention.
4. A look at the history of victories over insurgents, 30 June 2010
5. COINistas point to Kenya as a COIN success. In fact it was an expensive bloody failure., 7 August 2012

Powerful South Sudanese military leader dies

Quote:

Historians describe Matip as a man driven more by ambition during the war than by ideology. 

He was "the quintessential freebooter, willing to ally himself with God or the devil, depending on which would supply him with the resources to sustain his panache and his private army," Sudan historian Robert O Collins wrote. 

One of his main interests during the war was protecting and developing a "small trading empire" based on cattle and sorghum in the areas near Bentiu, capital of Unity State, according to historian Douglas Johnson.