Sunday 31 July 2011
How to be an Afghan Expert
Cynical post over at Ghosts of Alexander on how to be an Afghanistan expert.
The Moro War: An Insurgency and Its Lessons
Review of The Moro War by Mark Moyar, the author of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq.
Some key points (I've pruned, but not much - there was so much good stuff.)
The Americans in Moroland outlawed slavery and polygamy. The governors required Moro children to attend secular schools instead of Islamic ones. To halt rampant armed robbery, the administrators compelled every Moro man to surrender his sword. Mr. Arnold concedes that, despite some protestation, many Moros liked the American policies and beseeched the U.S. to delay plans for their self-rule.
Other aspects of the Moro War, though, bear close resemblance to recent Islamic insurgencies. In Moroland as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. introduced Western principles of law, government and education without explaining to Muslims how such principles were consistent with the Quran. Religiously motivated violence resulted.
"The Moros saw American military restraint as weakness," he writes. "The Moro understanding of Mohammed's life story taught that a party engaged in diplomacy merely to buy time to recover from setback."
Early counterinsurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from the same ignorance. Western nations, impatient to appear benevolent and remove their troops, showed a reluctance to use force and an eagerness to negotiate that conveyed weakness. Some Western policy makers still have not grasped that displaying an eagerness to use force and a reluctance to negotiate offers the most promising route to peace. ["Be prepared to kill"]
But other officers, like Tasker Bliss and John Pershing, defused crises by first talking with local leaders. Sometimes the Moros backed down when confronted by stern talk and the threat of force. Sometimes they did not and had to be given what Pershing called "a good sound drubbing." By talking before shooting, Americans increased U.S. influence, building personal relationships and demonstrating a commitment to impartial justice.
When Americans stepped in, they were able to resolve Moro legal clashes fairly, gaining respect. One officer explained that spending days in the heat hearing testimony about the contested ownership of a buffalo "seemed at times to be without purpose and without result," but "the results in the end were prodigious; nothing less than the trust, confidence, and affection of the huge majority of the Moro people."
As Mr. Arnold notes, the patience, knowledge and talent required for prolonged dealings with the Moros were scarce commodities. It was a good thing, one officer remarked, that Gen. Pershing was put in charge instead of "some fool officer who ignorantly supposed that he could come and in an off-hand manner manage these savages."
Proper qualifications are as scarce now as then. Thus assigning the right Americans to work with Afghans will rank among the U.S.'s greatest challenges in the coming years. From the start, a respect for Afghan sovereignty has required U.S. officials to rely heavily on personal influence and negotiation to get Afghans to do the right thing. That reliance will only increase as the reduction in America's presence brings Afghan stewardship to the fore.
Some key points (I've pruned, but not much - there was so much good stuff.)
The Americans in Moroland outlawed slavery and polygamy. The governors required Moro children to attend secular schools instead of Islamic ones. To halt rampant armed robbery, the administrators compelled every Moro man to surrender his sword. Mr. Arnold concedes that, despite some protestation, many Moros liked the American policies and beseeched the U.S. to delay plans for their self-rule.
Other aspects of the Moro War, though, bear close resemblance to recent Islamic insurgencies. In Moroland as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. introduced Western principles of law, government and education without explaining to Muslims how such principles were consistent with the Quran. Religiously motivated violence resulted.
"The Moros saw American military restraint as weakness," he writes. "The Moro understanding of Mohammed's life story taught that a party engaged in diplomacy merely to buy time to recover from setback."
Early counterinsurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from the same ignorance. Western nations, impatient to appear benevolent and remove their troops, showed a reluctance to use force and an eagerness to negotiate that conveyed weakness. Some Western policy makers still have not grasped that displaying an eagerness to use force and a reluctance to negotiate offers the most promising route to peace. ["Be prepared to kill"]
But other officers, like Tasker Bliss and John Pershing, defused crises by first talking with local leaders. Sometimes the Moros backed down when confronted by stern talk and the threat of force. Sometimes they did not and had to be given what Pershing called "a good sound drubbing." By talking before shooting, Americans increased U.S. influence, building personal relationships and demonstrating a commitment to impartial justice.
When Americans stepped in, they were able to resolve Moro legal clashes fairly, gaining respect. One officer explained that spending days in the heat hearing testimony about the contested ownership of a buffalo "seemed at times to be without purpose and without result," but "the results in the end were prodigious; nothing less than the trust, confidence, and affection of the huge majority of the Moro people."
As Mr. Arnold notes, the patience, knowledge and talent required for prolonged dealings with the Moros were scarce commodities. It was a good thing, one officer remarked, that Gen. Pershing was put in charge instead of "some fool officer who ignorantly supposed that he could come and in an off-hand manner manage these savages."
Proper qualifications are as scarce now as then. Thus assigning the right Americans to work with Afghans will rank among the U.S.'s greatest challenges in the coming years. From the start, a respect for Afghan sovereignty has required U.S. officials to rely heavily on personal influence and negotiation to get Afghans to do the right thing. That reliance will only increase as the reduction in America's presence brings Afghan stewardship to the fore.
Terence Wood on the foreign aid debate
Aid is no panacea: it can’t solve all the problems of the world by any means. But it can, and does, help. Similarly economic growth has an important role to play. Yet economic growth isn’t everything either, and even in its absence some good can be done.
Terence Wood is a PhD student at ANU. Prior to commencing study he worked for the New Zealand government aid programme.
Behind Africa’s famine, more than just drought
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/behind-africas-famine-more-than-just-drought-famine-isnt-inevitable/2011/07/28/gIQAJCrsfI_story.html
By William G. Moseley, Published: July 29
More than 12 million people are at risk of death and starvation in the Horn of Africa. Even if they do not perish, young children are likely to suffer the lifelong effects of malnutrition, including poor brain development. While reactions of grave concern over this unfolding tragedy are natural, its causes are not. Most commentators cite the worst droughts since the 1950s and security concerns in southern Somalia as the main reasons for the crisis. Taken alone, however, these explanations are deeply flawed.
Drought and insecurity certainly contribute to the current crisis, but more fundamental causes are at play. Drought is not a new environmental condition for much of Africa but a recurring one. The semi-arid Horn of Africa and the entire Sahelian region — running just south of the Sahara Desert across the continent — have long experienced erratic rainfall. While climate change may be exacerbating rainfall variability, traditional livelihoods in the region are adaptable to deal with situations when rainfall is not dependable.
The dominant livelihood in the Horn of Africa has long been herding. Traditionally, herders ranged widely across the landscape in search of better pasture, focusing on areas as meteorological conditions dictated. The approach worked because, unlike fenced-in pastures in North America, it was incredibly flexible and adapted to variable rainfall. As farming has expanded, including in some instances to large-scale commercial farms, the routes of herders have become more concentrated and more vulnerable to drought. The change from traditional practices has also become detrimental to the landscape. In Ethiopia, large land leases (or “land grabs”) to foreign governments and companies for export crops (such as palm oil, rice and sugar) have further exacerbated this problem.
Agricultural livelihoods have also evolved in problematic ways. In anticipation of years of poor rainfall, farming households and communities historically stored surplus crop production. Sadly, this traditional strategy for mitigating the risk of drought was undermined from the colonial period, beginning in the late 19th century, as households were encouraged (if not coerced by taxation) to grow cash crops for the market and store less and less excess grain for potential bad years. This increasing market orientation has also been encouraged by development banks. Growing crops for market worked fine as long as cheap and plentiful grain was available for purchase, a trend that began to erode in 2000 as global food prices gradually rose.
Just as death from exposure is not an inherent result of a cold winter, famine is not a natural consequence of drought. Simply put, the structure of human society often determines who is affected and to what degree.
While the nations of the world must act immediately to address the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa, working to ensure prompt delivery and distribution of food aid, these same countries must also consider the underlying causes of the crisis as they seek longer-term solutions. Many, including the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Rajiv Shah, have spoken about the need for a strategy to rebuild food security in the region.
The problem is that the USAID plan for agricultural development in Africa has stressed a “New Green Revolution” involving improved seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. While this energy-intensive approach may make sense in some contexts, it is financially out of reach of the poorest of poor farmers, who are the most likely to face food shortfalls. A more realistic approach would play down imported seeds and commercial agriculture in favor of enhanced traditional approaches to producing food for families and local markets.
Ethiopia, a key recipient of U.S. aid in the Horn of Africa region, should also be strongly discouraged from granting long-term leases of its farmland to foreign entities when it struggles to feed its own people in years of poor rainfall.
Finally, the crisis in the Horn of Africa has been aggravated by high food prices worldwide. Global food prices reached a historic high in February, surpassing the spikes of 2007-08, which had been the highest recorded in 20 years. While current prices are related, in part, to bad weather, other significant factors include high energy prices, the increasing diversion of grain for the production of biofuels, and export restrictions.
With energy and food prices likely to remain high for months to come, Africa can no longer count on cheap imported food or afford to shift to energy-intensive crop production strategies. The path to improved food security lies in improving time-tested local approaches, which are attuned to local environmental conditions.
The writer is a professor of geography and African studies at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minn. He previously worked for Save the Children (UK) on food security issues in Africa.
By William G. Moseley, Published: July 29
More than 12 million people are at risk of death and starvation in the Horn of Africa. Even if they do not perish, young children are likely to suffer the lifelong effects of malnutrition, including poor brain development. While reactions of grave concern over this unfolding tragedy are natural, its causes are not. Most commentators cite the worst droughts since the 1950s and security concerns in southern Somalia as the main reasons for the crisis. Taken alone, however, these explanations are deeply flawed.
Drought and insecurity certainly contribute to the current crisis, but more fundamental causes are at play. Drought is not a new environmental condition for much of Africa but a recurring one. The semi-arid Horn of Africa and the entire Sahelian region — running just south of the Sahara Desert across the continent — have long experienced erratic rainfall. While climate change may be exacerbating rainfall variability, traditional livelihoods in the region are adaptable to deal with situations when rainfall is not dependable.
The dominant livelihood in the Horn of Africa has long been herding. Traditionally, herders ranged widely across the landscape in search of better pasture, focusing on areas as meteorological conditions dictated. The approach worked because, unlike fenced-in pastures in North America, it was incredibly flexible and adapted to variable rainfall. As farming has expanded, including in some instances to large-scale commercial farms, the routes of herders have become more concentrated and more vulnerable to drought. The change from traditional practices has also become detrimental to the landscape. In Ethiopia, large land leases (or “land grabs”) to foreign governments and companies for export crops (such as palm oil, rice and sugar) have further exacerbated this problem.
Agricultural livelihoods have also evolved in problematic ways. In anticipation of years of poor rainfall, farming households and communities historically stored surplus crop production. Sadly, this traditional strategy for mitigating the risk of drought was undermined from the colonial period, beginning in the late 19th century, as households were encouraged (if not coerced by taxation) to grow cash crops for the market and store less and less excess grain for potential bad years. This increasing market orientation has also been encouraged by development banks. Growing crops for market worked fine as long as cheap and plentiful grain was available for purchase, a trend that began to erode in 2000 as global food prices gradually rose.
Just as death from exposure is not an inherent result of a cold winter, famine is not a natural consequence of drought. Simply put, the structure of human society often determines who is affected and to what degree.
While the nations of the world must act immediately to address the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa, working to ensure prompt delivery and distribution of food aid, these same countries must also consider the underlying causes of the crisis as they seek longer-term solutions. Many, including the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Rajiv Shah, have spoken about the need for a strategy to rebuild food security in the region.
The problem is that the USAID plan for agricultural development in Africa has stressed a “New Green Revolution” involving improved seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. While this energy-intensive approach may make sense in some contexts, it is financially out of reach of the poorest of poor farmers, who are the most likely to face food shortfalls. A more realistic approach would play down imported seeds and commercial agriculture in favor of enhanced traditional approaches to producing food for families and local markets.
Ethiopia, a key recipient of U.S. aid in the Horn of Africa region, should also be strongly discouraged from granting long-term leases of its farmland to foreign entities when it struggles to feed its own people in years of poor rainfall.
Finally, the crisis in the Horn of Africa has been aggravated by high food prices worldwide. Global food prices reached a historic high in February, surpassing the spikes of 2007-08, which had been the highest recorded in 20 years. While current prices are related, in part, to bad weather, other significant factors include high energy prices, the increasing diversion of grain for the production of biofuels, and export restrictions.
With energy and food prices likely to remain high for months to come, Africa can no longer count on cheap imported food or afford to shift to energy-intensive crop production strategies. The path to improved food security lies in improving time-tested local approaches, which are attuned to local environmental conditions.
The writer is a professor of geography and African studies at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minn. He previously worked for Save the Children (UK) on food security issues in Africa.
Friday 29 July 2011
Did the world react too late to signs of famine in Somalia?
The Economist on the scandal surrounding the famine in Somalia.
Famine has a technical meaning these days. It is declared when 30% of children are acutely malnourished, 20% of the population is without food, and deaths are running at two per 10,000 adults or four per 10,000 children every day. ...
Yet famine was not declared until July, eight months after the first FEWS Net forecast. ...
Outsiders’ caution is linked to the role of the Shabab... The Shabab has banned food aid in most of southern Somalia since 2009, branding Western aid agencies anti-Muslim. The WFP, the biggest provider of food aid, has had 14 staff killed there since 2008. Agencies also worry that militias use food aid to rally their troops—some say this happened in Ethiopia and Eritrea in the 1980s—and do not want to pile into southern Somalia to find they have reinvigorated the Shabab.
... Some, but not all, parts of the Shabab seem to be looking for help. [Chance to split al-Shabaab?]
...
... FEWS Net may have predicted famine but nothing happened until television cameras showed up, beaming out pictures of fragile children arriving at the huge Kenyan refugee camp at Dadaab in large numbers. Aid officers worry about being criticised by the public and their own bosses if they spend scarce resources before there is an outcry. The result is that donors often ignore their own early warnings. “We’re not behaving like good risk managers,” worries Duncan Green, the head of research at Oxfam.
...
Quite apart from the death toll and the misery, this is criminally wasteful. When famine threatened Niger in 2005, the cost of help was put at $7 a head. No one did much; the famine struck; the cost of help ended up at $23 each. Economic incentives and early-warning systems say donors should act early. But the political incentives advise delay—until it is too late.
MOTHERLODE: Village Security
Thanks to the Small Wars Journal, I may have just found the village security motherlode in the form of the JFK Special Warfare School.
Revising FM 3-24
Abu Muqawama on the same topic.
Here is the money quote:
Here is the money quote:
My primary criticism of the doctrine as it is currently written is the doctrine's weakness with respect to waging counterinsurgency as a third party, something both Charlie "Erin" Simpson and Steve Biddle have written a lot about.
Thursday 28 July 2011
Prine-Burke-Few Doctrine and the COINdinistra Manual
Jason Fritz at Inkspots comments on the Small Wars Journal article calling for an upgrade to the Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
Note the comment on police reform. I am convinced that policing is the key to the future of war.
Note the comment on police reform. I am convinced that policing is the key to the future of war.
...I think these three thinkers and experienced counterinsurgents took the right approach: concise points on why the current doctrine is insufficient that should be readily apparent to anyone who has participated in COIN operations. ...I would suggest adding a few more to the list, though.
1. The new manual should spend some time and space discussing counterinsurgency as it fits within and relates to the total spectrum of warfare.
2. Speaking of #12, the new manual should go beyond the fact that legitimate violence is an element of COIN and expand on how to use it: primarily the use of indirect and air fires.
3. We need a better discussion of ends. I don't know that the new manual wants to wade into the minefield that is COIN metrics... We just had no idea what we were working towards other than "better than things are now" - talk about mission creep potential.
4. Interagency, interagency, interagency. ... I could write a book on this topic, because it's still so screwed up (you don't want to get me started on [b]police reform[/b], for instance)...
Wednesday 27 July 2011
When having a strong economy is not enough...
Harold Mitchell is the chairman of CARE Australia.
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/when-having-a-strong-economy-is-not-enough--20110724-1hvez.html#ixzz1TM9xK9XD
THERE is a lot of fuzzy thinking about Australia's foreign aid. It is time to be much clearer about what aid can and can't achieve.
Hugh White, on this page last Tuesday ("Economic growth, not foreign aid, is overcoming long-term poverty in the world"), asked why Australia was increasing its aid program when poverty was actually being beaten by economic growth.
...Papua New Guinea has seen strong economic growth over the past five years, but it is not clear that it is being translated into lower levels of poverty.
Economic growth needs to be coupled with effective government institutions, a vibrant civil society and with a population that can take advantage of the opportunities that economic growth may provide.
Aid has played an important role in enabling poor people to take advantage of economic growth. About 80 per cent of children in developing countries now get basic vaccinations. About half these vaccinations are funded through aid programs. Millions of children are studying in schools funded by aid, with school books delivered by aid programs. These children often eat school lunches funded by aid, too. This aid often leverages greater efficiency and effectiveness in government resources through better tender processes and improving policies.
...
...Without basic healthcare and a decent education, economic growth passes you by.
About 60 per cent of aid from all donors goes to support these basic improvements in the living standards of ordinary people who just haven't had the chances Australians take for granted.
About 22 per cent of all aid goes to support economic growth by providing infrastructure, improving agriculture and so on. A further 12 per cent responds to humanitarian crises, such as the current terrible drought and famine in east Africa.
...
First, let's remember that economic growth is powerful, but it takes a long time. If a country's economy grows by 7 per cent a year for a decade, then its economy will double. If your population grows at the same time, say around 3 per cent, then the resources per person won't double and it might take 15 years or more for this to happen. So for a country such as Indonesia, with a GDP per person of around $3000, it will take many decades of sustained economic growth for it to reach Australia's level of $55,600. In the meantime, I think it makes sense for Australia to make a contribution to help the Indonesian people overcome poverty.
Second, economic growth is never distributed evenly. Government policies need to promote growth and at the same time provide services to everyone. Poor countries with very limited resources just can't do this; nor can poor families. That is why many poor families in developing countries don't send all their children to school. It is usually the daughters who stay at home doing housework or helping on farms or in shops. When they miss out on even a basic education, they are set up for a lifetime of disadvantage. By focusing our aid on those who are most disadvantaged, particularly women, they are more able to seize the opportunities of a growing economy.
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/when-having-a-strong-economy-is-not-enough--20110724-1hvez.html#ixzz1TM9xK9XD
THERE is a lot of fuzzy thinking about Australia's foreign aid. It is time to be much clearer about what aid can and can't achieve.
Hugh White, on this page last Tuesday ("Economic growth, not foreign aid, is overcoming long-term poverty in the world"), asked why Australia was increasing its aid program when poverty was actually being beaten by economic growth.
...Papua New Guinea has seen strong economic growth over the past five years, but it is not clear that it is being translated into lower levels of poverty.
Economic growth needs to be coupled with effective government institutions, a vibrant civil society and with a population that can take advantage of the opportunities that economic growth may provide.
Aid has played an important role in enabling poor people to take advantage of economic growth. About 80 per cent of children in developing countries now get basic vaccinations. About half these vaccinations are funded through aid programs. Millions of children are studying in schools funded by aid, with school books delivered by aid programs. These children often eat school lunches funded by aid, too. This aid often leverages greater efficiency and effectiveness in government resources through better tender processes and improving policies.
...
...Without basic healthcare and a decent education, economic growth passes you by.
About 60 per cent of aid from all donors goes to support these basic improvements in the living standards of ordinary people who just haven't had the chances Australians take for granted.
About 22 per cent of all aid goes to support economic growth by providing infrastructure, improving agriculture and so on. A further 12 per cent responds to humanitarian crises, such as the current terrible drought and famine in east Africa.
...
First, let's remember that economic growth is powerful, but it takes a long time. If a country's economy grows by 7 per cent a year for a decade, then its economy will double. If your population grows at the same time, say around 3 per cent, then the resources per person won't double and it might take 15 years or more for this to happen. So for a country such as Indonesia, with a GDP per person of around $3000, it will take many decades of sustained economic growth for it to reach Australia's level of $55,600. In the meantime, I think it makes sense for Australia to make a contribution to help the Indonesian people overcome poverty.
Second, economic growth is never distributed evenly. Government policies need to promote growth and at the same time provide services to everyone. Poor countries with very limited resources just can't do this; nor can poor families. That is why many poor families in developing countries don't send all their children to school. It is usually the daughters who stay at home doing housework or helping on farms or in shops. When they miss out on even a basic education, they are set up for a lifetime of disadvantage. By focusing our aid on those who are most disadvantaged, particularly women, they are more able to seize the opportunities of a growing economy.
MIFFs: Middle Income, Fragile or Failing states
Andy Summer on MIFFs:
Picked up by The Economist:
*Two Trends in Global Poverty, by Geoffrey Gertz and Laurence Chandy. Brookings Institution, 2011 **Conflict, Security and Development, The World Bank.
What do Pakistan, Yemen, Nigeria, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Sudan and perhaps Libya, Egypt and Tunisia have in common? Fragility and middle-income status.
Picked up by The Economist:
Yet strikingly, some 15 of the 56 countries on the bank’s lower-middle income list (ie, over a quarter) also appear on the list of fragile and failed states maintained by the OECD, a rich-country club.
*Two Trends in Global Poverty, by Geoffrey Gertz and Laurence Chandy. Brookings Institution, 2011 **Conflict, Security and Development, The World Bank.
Sunday 24 July 2011
Our undeserved COIN reputation
Jim Molan on COIN.
When Dr Milton Osborne was writing his Lowy Perspectives Paper, Getting the Job Done: Iraq and the Malayan Emergency, in February 2005, I was trying to do counter-insurgency in Iraq, and I could really have used that paper.
...
I never met anyone in any position of authority who said that success in these wars could be achieved by military forces alone, but the creation of relative security for the people by the use of military or para-military forces is the first and most essential step.
When Dr Milton Osborne was writing his Lowy Perspectives Paper, Getting the Job Done: Iraq and the Malayan Emergency, in February 2005, I was trying to do counter-insurgency in Iraq, and I could really have used that paper.
...
I never met anyone in any position of authority who said that success in these wars could be achieved by military forces alone, but the creation of relative security for the people by the use of military or para-military forces is the first and most essential step.
Saturday 23 July 2011
Feachem on aid and growth
Sir Richard Feachem concludes that "the link between aid and growth was either weak or non-existent".
Sound file included.
Takeaways:
* Government policies, not aid, create economic growth.
* Aid does not make you loved. Exceptions: Higher education assistance.
* Successes: health.
* Failures: Economic growth per capita etc.
Sound file included.
Takeaways:
* Government policies, not aid, create economic growth.
* Aid does not make you loved. Exceptions: Higher education assistance.
* Successes: health.
* Failures: Economic growth per capita etc.
What is the rationale for foreign aid?
The argument continues. Here's Hugh White's response to Annmaree's response.
I'm not 'anti-aid'. But I do think that we should be clear about what the aid program is trying to achieve, and I think both the Aid Review and the Government's response have left that very muddled. Both say that the primary purpose of Australia's aid is to 'overcome poverty'. Is that something aid can do?
Friday 22 July 2011
There's more to development than money
H/t The Interpreter
Opinion by Annmaree O'Keeffe.
There's more to development than money
By Annmaree O'Keeffe - 20 July 2011 12:22PM
Annmaree O'Keeffe is a Lowy Institute research fellow. She has served as Australian Ambassador for HIV/AIDS and Deputy Director General of AusAID.
...it was argued in the report released earlier this month by the team who reviewed Australia's aid program. As the report puts it :
'There is no single recipe for development progress. Commonly cited development success stories, such as South Korea, Botswana and Singapore, have used different policies and adopted different priorities. But there are some basic principles that underlie development success. These include economic growth, investing in opportunities and building strong institutions'.
...
The significant value of aid is as a catalyst; a reformer; advocate; banker of last resort; innovator; rescuer; and yes, it can even be in the donor country's own interest. Don't take my word for it, look at these examples.
Example 1: The 2000 Millennium Development Summit provided the crucible for a new global development paradigm — the 2015 Millennium Development Goals – which continues to inspire and shape the approach and objectives of the global strategy for reducing poverty and improving the quality of life. Each of the goals target fundamental factors affecting quality of life — hunger, health, education, gender equity, environment — and the 2015 targets seek to make significant improvements in each.
While progress hasn't been smooth across all countries, and the global financial crisis played its part in affecting the MDG efforts, 2015 will see major advances in reducing poverty and improving the quality of lives for the poor. The role of aid in achieving these advances is in part through developed country support to developing country services and systems. But a particularly important role the MDG has played, is as the advocate for the poor. How to reduce global poverty is now in the thinking of domestic and international policy makers because they are aware of it, and the pressure is on to do something about it. This wasn't always the case.
Example 2: One of the most successful international innovations of the past decade has been the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Created in 2002 as a public/private partnership, it emerged from an environment of mounting concern about the effects of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria in developing countries.
As a financing mechanism, it has been particularly effective at attracting and channeling large amounts into country-owned programs to fight these diseases. Thanks to that funding, 3.2 million people are now receiving antiretroviral treatment for HIV, 8.2 million new cases of TB have been detected and are being treated and 190 million insecticide-treated bed nets have been distributed to reduce malaria infection.
Example 3: The GAVI Alliance was started in 2000 as a global health partnership bringing together private and public sectors, government, pharmaceutical companies, researchers, civil society organisations and relevant multilateral organisations. Its role was and still is to fund immunisation programs in the world's poorest countries. Its uniqueness lies in the way it applies donor funding to adopt market-based solutions to public health funding.
A particularly smart innovation is providing incentives to pharmaceutical companies to undertake the needed research and development of vaccines for diseases affecting developing countries. Left to market forces, these diseases would not attract the attention of the pharmaceuticals because of the very limited promise of eventual returns on their research investments.
Close to home, in PNG and the Pacific, it's evident that there are still major development challenges confronting this region. The reality is that some of the small Pacific states simply do not have the physical resources and human numbers to be ever completely economically self-reliant. It is a reality which has been acknowledged for some time.
With regard to PNG, it is not just a developing country with major challenges. Last time I looked, you could still walk to PNG from Australia at low tide. It is a country where the national interest objective intersects with the humanitarian objective for Australia's aid program. PNG is lagging behind on achieving the MDGs, and there are real governance issues that the government of PNG has to take responsibility for. But it is less reliant on aid, and the proportion of Australia's aid is now equivalent to less than 5% of PNG's gross domestic product, down from 20% at the time of Independence in 1975.
Opinion by Annmaree O'Keeffe.
There's more to development than money
By Annmaree O'Keeffe - 20 July 2011 12:22PM
Annmaree O'Keeffe is a Lowy Institute research fellow. She has served as Australian Ambassador for HIV/AIDS and Deputy Director General of AusAID.
...it was argued in the report released earlier this month by the team who reviewed Australia's aid program. As the report puts it :
'There is no single recipe for development progress. Commonly cited development success stories, such as South Korea, Botswana and Singapore, have used different policies and adopted different priorities. But there are some basic principles that underlie development success. These include economic growth, investing in opportunities and building strong institutions'.
...
The significant value of aid is as a catalyst; a reformer; advocate; banker of last resort; innovator; rescuer; and yes, it can even be in the donor country's own interest. Don't take my word for it, look at these examples.
Example 1: The 2000 Millennium Development Summit provided the crucible for a new global development paradigm — the 2015 Millennium Development Goals – which continues to inspire and shape the approach and objectives of the global strategy for reducing poverty and improving the quality of life. Each of the goals target fundamental factors affecting quality of life — hunger, health, education, gender equity, environment — and the 2015 targets seek to make significant improvements in each.
While progress hasn't been smooth across all countries, and the global financial crisis played its part in affecting the MDG efforts, 2015 will see major advances in reducing poverty and improving the quality of lives for the poor. The role of aid in achieving these advances is in part through developed country support to developing country services and systems. But a particularly important role the MDG has played, is as the advocate for the poor. How to reduce global poverty is now in the thinking of domestic and international policy makers because they are aware of it, and the pressure is on to do something about it. This wasn't always the case.
Example 2: One of the most successful international innovations of the past decade has been the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Created in 2002 as a public/private partnership, it emerged from an environment of mounting concern about the effects of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria in developing countries.
As a financing mechanism, it has been particularly effective at attracting and channeling large amounts into country-owned programs to fight these diseases. Thanks to that funding, 3.2 million people are now receiving antiretroviral treatment for HIV, 8.2 million new cases of TB have been detected and are being treated and 190 million insecticide-treated bed nets have been distributed to reduce malaria infection.
Example 3: The GAVI Alliance was started in 2000 as a global health partnership bringing together private and public sectors, government, pharmaceutical companies, researchers, civil society organisations and relevant multilateral organisations. Its role was and still is to fund immunisation programs in the world's poorest countries. Its uniqueness lies in the way it applies donor funding to adopt market-based solutions to public health funding.
A particularly smart innovation is providing incentives to pharmaceutical companies to undertake the needed research and development of vaccines for diseases affecting developing countries. Left to market forces, these diseases would not attract the attention of the pharmaceuticals because of the very limited promise of eventual returns on their research investments.
Close to home, in PNG and the Pacific, it's evident that there are still major development challenges confronting this region. The reality is that some of the small Pacific states simply do not have the physical resources and human numbers to be ever completely economically self-reliant. It is a reality which has been acknowledged for some time.
With regard to PNG, it is not just a developing country with major challenges. Last time I looked, you could still walk to PNG from Australia at low tide. It is a country where the national interest objective intersects with the humanitarian objective for Australia's aid program. PNG is lagging behind on achieving the MDGs, and there are real governance issues that the government of PNG has to take responsibility for. But it is less reliant on aid, and the proportion of Australia's aid is now equivalent to less than 5% of PNG's gross domestic product, down from 20% at the time of Independence in 1975.
Saturday 16 July 2011
Friday 15 July 2011
Sangin Province: What Worked
What Worked
A. Military successes stimulated reconciliation and population mobilization. The population-centric COIN that preceded the Marines had relied on political outreach and economic development to convince Sangin’s residents to abandon the insurgency and join the government side. Military force was minimized based on the theory that violence would create “accidental guerrillas,” kill off potential negotiating partners and alienate the insurgents so much that they would never consider reconciling with the government. This approach accomplished little. In fact, the counterinsurgents’ aversion to the use of force and their eagerness to negotiate most likely discouraged a political compromise because they suggested that the insurgents could win a complete victory by waiting the foreigners out. As it turned out, the Marines made much greater progress in reconciliation and population mobilization because their military successes raised the costs in lives and property that communities and families paid for supporting the insurgency and convinced the opportunists that the coalition would prevail.
B. The Marines put stabilization ahead of transition. Preceding military commanders and civilian officials had sought to facilitate transition by assigning greater responsibility to Afghans. The Marines concluded that the enemy was too strong and the Afghan government too weak to permit a successful transition under these conditions. Instead, they decided to take the lead in security operations in order to set the conditions for ultimate success. By reducing violence and permitting government officials freedom of movement, they put the government on a viable path to sustainable transition. This shift in approach mirrored the shift in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, when initial efforts to transition responsibility to Iraqis failed so spectacularly that the Americans chose to retake the lead in security until the situation stabilized. In both instances, a de-emphasis on transition actually improved the prospects for transition and shortened the amount of time required for a successful handover.
C. Development aid was provided only when coalition personnel could visit the projects. The Marines stopped the funding of development projects in areas that could not be visited. This shift ensured that coalition personnel could verify firsthand whether projects were proceeding as intended, and disabused Afghans of the notion that the coalition was a collection of suckers. The Marine willingness to operate throughout the district greatly facilitated on-site inspections.
D. Counternarcotics took a back seat to stabilization. The Marines decided that they had too many enemies already to engage in large-scale counternarcotics activities. Much of the population depended on the opium industry for its livelihood, and could be expected to cling to insurgency more strongly if that livelihood were at stake. Counternarcotics could wait until the government had enough personnel and adequate security to undertake robust counternarcotics measures. Marine COIN operations did, however, have a large impact on the narcotics trade because many of the insurgents they captured or killed had been involved in it. Nevertheless, the narcotics industry continues to thrive in Sangin, and it now poses a vexing problem across Helmand, for the power brokers required for reconciliation, and at some level the officials of the Afghan government, are deeply invested in it will strongly resist actions that would harm the narcotics business.
A. Military successes stimulated reconciliation and population mobilization. The population-centric COIN that preceded the Marines had relied on political outreach and economic development to convince Sangin’s residents to abandon the insurgency and join the government side. Military force was minimized based on the theory that violence would create “accidental guerrillas,” kill off potential negotiating partners and alienate the insurgents so much that they would never consider reconciling with the government. This approach accomplished little. In fact, the counterinsurgents’ aversion to the use of force and their eagerness to negotiate most likely discouraged a political compromise because they suggested that the insurgents could win a complete victory by waiting the foreigners out. As it turned out, the Marines made much greater progress in reconciliation and population mobilization because their military successes raised the costs in lives and property that communities and families paid for supporting the insurgency and convinced the opportunists that the coalition would prevail.
B. The Marines put stabilization ahead of transition. Preceding military commanders and civilian officials had sought to facilitate transition by assigning greater responsibility to Afghans. The Marines concluded that the enemy was too strong and the Afghan government too weak to permit a successful transition under these conditions. Instead, they decided to take the lead in security operations in order to set the conditions for ultimate success. By reducing violence and permitting government officials freedom of movement, they put the government on a viable path to sustainable transition. This shift in approach mirrored the shift in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, when initial efforts to transition responsibility to Iraqis failed so spectacularly that the Americans chose to retake the lead in security until the situation stabilized. In both instances, a de-emphasis on transition actually improved the prospects for transition and shortened the amount of time required for a successful handover.
C. Development aid was provided only when coalition personnel could visit the projects. The Marines stopped the funding of development projects in areas that could not be visited. This shift ensured that coalition personnel could verify firsthand whether projects were proceeding as intended, and disabused Afghans of the notion that the coalition was a collection of suckers. The Marine willingness to operate throughout the district greatly facilitated on-site inspections.
D. Counternarcotics took a back seat to stabilization. The Marines decided that they had too many enemies already to engage in large-scale counternarcotics activities. Much of the population depended on the opium industry for its livelihood, and could be expected to cling to insurgency more strongly if that livelihood were at stake. Counternarcotics could wait until the government had enough personnel and adequate security to undertake robust counternarcotics measures. Marine COIN operations did, however, have a large impact on the narcotics trade because many of the insurgents they captured or killed had been involved in it. Nevertheless, the narcotics industry continues to thrive in Sangin, and it now poses a vexing problem across Helmand, for the power brokers required for reconciliation, and at some level the officials of the Afghan government, are deeply invested in it will strongly resist actions that would harm the narcotics business.
Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) program
The spring saw the first Marine recruitment of local self-defense forces, through the Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) program. The district police chief used CERP [Commanders' Emergency Response Program] funds to pay ISCI members for nonmilitary work, and in return they provided information and armed resistance to Taliban intrusion.
100 Firefights, Three Weeks: Inside Afghanistan’s Most Insane Fight
100 Firefights, Three Weeks: Inside Afghanistan’s Most Insane Fight
Combat Hunter Program
I've long said that policing is the future of war, but the big hunting thing was a new angle in this article.
Faced with an alarming increase in sniper attacks in Iraq, Marine commanders in late 2006 began looking for ways to turn the tables on an elusive enemy. Among the experts they consulted: a renowned African big game hunter and a former big city cop.
The result is the combat hunter program... The training combines outdoor skills culled from hunting and tracking with the street smarts developed by police and Marines who grew up in cities.
"The motto we … try to instill in these guys is Marines are always the hunter, never the hunted," says Ivan Carter, the safari guide and hunter...
...
While much of the military has focused on technology and improved armor to give soldiers an edge in Iraq, the Marine Corps embarked on a different approach with this program, aimed at developing new mind-sets and skills.
...
Marine commanders were also looking for ways to overcome a key advantage insurgents have: They can easily hide among civilians.
"Finding is the problem," Mattis says. "Our soldiers, SEALs and Marines are quite capable of killing these guys. It's how do you find them."
Commanders turned to cops for advice, but they also looked within their own ranks — to Marines who grew up in inner cities.
"The inner-city kid has a unique perspective," says Greg Williams, a retired Detroit area police officer who was recruited by the military to help develop the program. "They have a stronger urban survival instinct. The inner city kid … will see the world a little differently, a little more opportunistically."
...
During a conference at Camp Pendleton last year, Williams and a sergeant took a group of skeptical senior officers for a walk in a nearby town. The sergeant pointed out dangerous neighborhoods based on where cars were parked, whether there were toys in the yards and other signs that they noticed but the older officers did not.
...
Marines can be taught to pick out criminals and insurgents trying to blend into a crowd, if they know what to look for, Williams says.
...
The typical Marine rifleman carries about 97 pounds of equipment... The recommended load is about 50 pounds, according to a Naval Research Advisory Committee report called, "Lightening the Load."
...
"It doesn't mean we're going out there to kill everything we can," Lethin says. "We're hunting the enemy — those insurgents … hiding among the people.
Faced with an alarming increase in sniper attacks in Iraq, Marine commanders in late 2006 began looking for ways to turn the tables on an elusive enemy. Among the experts they consulted: a renowned African big game hunter and a former big city cop.
The result is the combat hunter program... The training combines outdoor skills culled from hunting and tracking with the street smarts developed by police and Marines who grew up in cities.
"The motto we … try to instill in these guys is Marines are always the hunter, never the hunted," says Ivan Carter, the safari guide and hunter...
...
While much of the military has focused on technology and improved armor to give soldiers an edge in Iraq, the Marine Corps embarked on a different approach with this program, aimed at developing new mind-sets and skills.
...
Marine commanders were also looking for ways to overcome a key advantage insurgents have: They can easily hide among civilians.
"Finding is the problem," Mattis says. "Our soldiers, SEALs and Marines are quite capable of killing these guys. It's how do you find them."
Commanders turned to cops for advice, but they also looked within their own ranks — to Marines who grew up in inner cities.
"The inner-city kid has a unique perspective," says Greg Williams, a retired Detroit area police officer who was recruited by the military to help develop the program. "They have a stronger urban survival instinct. The inner city kid … will see the world a little differently, a little more opportunistically."
...
During a conference at Camp Pendleton last year, Williams and a sergeant took a group of skeptical senior officers for a walk in a nearby town. The sergeant pointed out dangerous neighborhoods based on where cars were parked, whether there were toys in the yards and other signs that they noticed but the older officers did not.
...
Marines can be taught to pick out criminals and insurgents trying to blend into a crowd, if they know what to look for, Williams says.
...
The typical Marine rifleman carries about 97 pounds of equipment... The recommended load is about 50 pounds, according to a Naval Research Advisory Committee report called, "Lightening the Load."
...
"It doesn't mean we're going out there to kill everything we can," Lethin says. "We're hunting the enemy — those insurgents … hiding among the people.
The Perception-centric Approach
Interesting article by Tom Brouns reposted by Mark Sedra.
Rather than a population-centric approach, I recommend a perception-centric approach. That is, all actions undertaken should build a growing perception that success is inevitable for the growing Afghan government. Efforts to curb corruption and enhance legitimacy, transparency, and responsibility are critical to this approach. International development efforts also support this approach, especially if they can somehow be portrayed as the result of efforts and decisions by Afghan leaders. However, the perception-centric approach must also be fully integrated in the military effort – to include policy (think detention and solatia payments), planning (are we seizing terrain or are we demonstrating Afghan capability?) and tactical operations (going beyond mitigation). Former RC South Commander MG Ton van Loon stated, "Every course of action that is likely to antagonize the population should be removed from consideration." To take this a step further, courses of action should be designed from the outset to increase popular support for their government.
Rather than a population-centric approach, I recommend a perception-centric approach. That is, all actions undertaken should build a growing perception that success is inevitable for the growing Afghan government. Efforts to curb corruption and enhance legitimacy, transparency, and responsibility are critical to this approach. International development efforts also support this approach, especially if they can somehow be portrayed as the result of efforts and decisions by Afghan leaders. However, the perception-centric approach must also be fully integrated in the military effort – to include policy (think detention and solatia payments), planning (are we seizing terrain or are we demonstrating Afghan capability?) and tactical operations (going beyond mitigation). Former RC South Commander MG Ton van Loon stated, "Every course of action that is likely to antagonize the population should be removed from consideration." To take this a step further, courses of action should be designed from the outset to increase popular support for their government.
Thursday 14 July 2011
Towards a Land-Based Solution for Somali Piracy
Rethinking the Cure: Towards a Land-Based Solution for Somali Piracy
Rashid Abdi, Maritime Counter Piracy Conference | 11 Apr 2011
Because the TFG has struggled to steer the process of devolution, impatient local communities in the periphery have, over the last four years, been busy rebuilding the rudiments of regional state institutions, improving inter-communal harmony, and experimenting with a quasi-democratic and consensual style of governance. In this, they are mimicking similar processes in Somaliland and Puntland. It is true, however, that some of these emerging self-governing regional polities are far from stable, and the gains they have made remain highly tenuous and reversible.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the “revolt against the centre,” and attempts to create viable local administrations, are genuine, organic and underpinned by a remarkable degree of popular support — a political development that stands in stark contrast with the hopeless situation in Mogadishu, where a weak and discredited TFG appears out of sync with the wishes and aspirations of its people. While it may not appear immediately obvious, international support for these fragile entities and “recovery” pockets in central and northern Somalia is the best means to banish the piracy menace from Somalia.
Rashid Abdi, Maritime Counter Piracy Conference | 11 Apr 2011
Because the TFG has struggled to steer the process of devolution, impatient local communities in the periphery have, over the last four years, been busy rebuilding the rudiments of regional state institutions, improving inter-communal harmony, and experimenting with a quasi-democratic and consensual style of governance. In this, they are mimicking similar processes in Somaliland and Puntland. It is true, however, that some of these emerging self-governing regional polities are far from stable, and the gains they have made remain highly tenuous and reversible.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the “revolt against the centre,” and attempts to create viable local administrations, are genuine, organic and underpinned by a remarkable degree of popular support — a political development that stands in stark contrast with the hopeless situation in Mogadishu, where a weak and discredited TFG appears out of sync with the wishes and aspirations of its people. While it may not appear immediately obvious, international support for these fragile entities and “recovery” pockets in central and northern Somalia is the best means to banish the piracy menace from Somalia.
Wednesday 13 July 2011
The future of Australian aid
Article by Annmaree O'Keeffe on the foreign aid review.
Annmaree O'Keeffe is a Lowy Institute research fellow. She has served as Australian Ambassador for HIV/AIDS and Deputy Director General of AusAID.
What sets this framework apart from its predecessors is its emphasis on people rather than states. While the national interest is still incorporated in the overall purpose of the program, it's the humanitarian aspect of aid that gets the bold headline – the fundamental purpose of Australian aid is to help people overcome poverty.
Annmaree O'Keeffe is a Lowy Institute research fellow. She has served as Australian Ambassador for HIV/AIDS and Deputy Director General of AusAID.
What sets this framework apart from its predecessors is its emphasis on people rather than states. While the national interest is still incorporated in the overall purpose of the program, it's the humanitarian aspect of aid that gets the bold headline – the fundamental purpose of Australian aid is to help people overcome poverty.
Tuesday 12 July 2011
Wars, Guns, and Votes
In a sequel to his award winning book on global poverty The Bottom Billion, Paul Collier comes to the sobering conclusion that democracy can make the poorest countries more dangerous. He also outlines how developed affluent nations can offer assistance to emerging democracies.
Unfortunately, only the transcript and not the audio is available.
The book is here.
Unfortunately, only the transcript and not the audio is available.
The book is here.
Tuesday 5 July 2011
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